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USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND CEMA AFFAIRS

CEMA: USING NATURAL GAS AS SUBSTITUTE FOR PETROLEUM

Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV in Russian
No 10, Oct 85 pp 65-68

[Article by Mukhsin Dzhalayev of the CEMA Secretariat: "Natural Gas Instead of Gasoline"]

[Text] The statement of the top-level CEMA economic conference notes that the CEMA countries will implement a set of measures aimed primarily at the rational use of energy carriers and raw material based on the introduction of progressive engineering processes, modern machinery and equipment and a change in the structure of the production and consumption of energy carriers and raw material. Decisions were adopted on the intensive development of the national economy and an acceleration of scientific-technical progress.

The General Agreement on multilateral cooperation in the use of natural gas as the motor fuel of means of transport which was signed at the 40th meeting of the CEMA Session corresponds fully to the set tasks. The agreement was signed by the chairmen of the central planning authorities of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, the Republic of Cuba, Poland, Romania, the CSSR and the USSR.

In accordance with the General Agreement, the interested countries will develop multilateral and, ensuing therefrom, bilateral scientific-technical and industrial cooperation in the development, creation and production of the basic types of machinery and equipment, parts and means of transport (including power-driven agricultural machinery) necessary for the production, storage and shipment, refueling and use of natural gas as a motor fuel.

For this purpose cooperation will be practiced in the following main areas:

- a) the creation of equipment and comprehensive installations for the production of compressed and liquefied gas;
- b) the creation of means of transporting the compressed and liquefied gas and refueling the conveyance vehicles, from existing gas pipelines included;
- c) the conversion of means of transport and adaptation of the engines for operation on natural gas and also the development of new engine designs permitting the more efficient use of this type of motor fuel.

The countries undertook via their corresponding organizations to promote the specialization and cooperation of production and reciprocal equipment supplies. The volume of such supplies for specific periods will be determined by agreements and contracts governing the production specialization and cooperation and also long-term commodity turnover agreements and protocols.

The CEMA countries occupy the leading place in the world in the production of fuel-energy resources. In 1984 the volume thereof in standard fuel equivalent constituted 2.6 billion tons, that is, as much as was produced in the same year by the United States and the Common Market countries together. Natural gas, production of which last year amounted to 607 billion cubic meters or 720 million tons of standard fuel, accounts for a considerable proportion of this amount. Natural gas' share of the CEMA countries' fuel-energy balance sheet in 1980 constituted 23.2 percent, an increase to 26.5 percent is anticipated for 1985, while by 1990 it will constitute approximately 30 percent of the total domestic consumption of energy resources.

Of the socialist community countries, only the USSR possesses a strong fuel-energy complex incorporating all types of energy carrier and in substantial quantities. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to constantly increase their production. This applies particularly to oil; for objective reasons the possibilities of its increased production are limited.

According to available data, the development of chemical industry at a faster pace in the CEMA countries is planned in the future, which is connected with the growth of the need for light petroleum products, which are the basic raw material for this sector of industry. For this reason the transition to an intensive path of the development of chemical industry gives rise to the need for the maximum economies in the most valuable raw material at all levels of its consumption by way of the extensive introduction of resource-saving equipment and technology.

Considering that the needs of the CEMA countries' national economies for motor fuels has recently been satisfied with continuously growing strain, the question of an expansion of the raw material base of the production of motor fuel was put on the agenda. Importance in this connection is attached to the use of natural gas both as raw material for chemical industry and the basis for obtaining motor fuel. Currently transport is one of the biggest consumers of energy resources, primarily high-calorific fuel oil--diesel, gasoline and kerosene. The energy contained in 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas is the equivalent of 700,000-1 million tons of oil-based motor fuel. Although it is among the nonrenewable energy resources, the reserves thereof are comparatively great. In the USSR prospected natural gas resources are several times greater than the discovered oil deposits.

The use of natural gas as motor fuel has a number of advantages over gasoline and diesel fuel: higher antiknock properties (the octane rating of natural gases is more than 100), reduction in the discharge of toxic substances with the exhaust gases into the atmosphere, a 1.5 times increase in the between-service

running time of the automobile and a 15-30 percent reduction in oil consumption, while its replacement time increases 2-2.5-fold as a result of reduced black deposits; for gasoline engines using gas the spark plug length of use increases 40 percent; compared with gasoline engine capacity increases 30-40 percent. Expenditure on fuel in freight shipments is halved. One cubic meter of gas substitutes for a liter of gasoline.

It is these advantages which, as world experience shows, are promoting the mass introduction of compressed gas as motor fuel. In Italy, for example, approximately 250,000 vehicles were operating thereon in 1983 even.

In the Soviet Union compressed natural gas was used as motor fuel back at the start of the 1950's. Approximately 20,000 trucks were transferred to it, and 20 gas-filling stations were built for refueling them. However, in connection with the high rate of development of the oil industry the use of natural gas in transport was not further developed at that time. Now it is planned in our country switching approximately 1 million vehicles to compressed natural gas by 1990. The production of ZIL and GAZ trucks which will operate on gas fuel has now been organized. The construction of model automotive gas-filling compressor stations has begun in different parts of the country. Work is also being performed in this field in other CEMA countries. Thus the first such station providing for the refueling with compressed gas of 1,000 vehicles per day was commissioned in the GDR in October 1984.

The creation of a corresponding system of automotive gas-filling compressor stations is needed primarily for the extensive use of compressed natural gas as motor fuel. Upon the transition to gas of carburetor or diesel engines engine design changes are not necessary, it is necessary only to change the feed arrangement. Adaptation of the automobiles amounts to the installation thereon of compressed gas cylinders connected via the gearbox to the engine. Positioning on trucks of 4-8 cylinders with a total mass of 400-700 kilos and on passenger automobiles of 3 cylinders with a mass of approximately 80 kilos provides for the operation of motor vehicles per refueling of up to 180-300 kilometers.

The installation of additional cylinders reduces the capacity and operating distance of the automobile. But even this problem is being tackled successfully. Studies conducted in the USSR permit the conclusion that the use of composition materials for the manufacture of high-pressure cylinders is promising. A metal-based laminated cylinder will have a mass of no more than 40 kilos (of alloyed steel it weighs 62.5 kilos, of carbon steel 93 kilos). A further reduction in mass could be achieved given the use of highly gas-tight plastics as a hermetic coating. The metal-base laminated cylinder ensures higher-than-usual safety in operation since it does not give off fragments in emergency situations.

Development of the problem of the use of compressed gas as motor fuel in the CEMA countries is at different technical and organizational levels. The determining document is the above-mentioned General Agreement, to which two programs are appended as inalienable parts: the Program of Cooperation in the Use of

Compressed Natural Gas as Motor Fuel in Transport and the Program of Scientific-Technical Cooperation in the Sphere of the Production and Use of Compressed Natural Gas as Motor Fuel in Transport.

The first program provides for the creation of prefabricated-composite and prefabricated-container automotive gas-filler compressor stations (AGFCS) and gas-filler stations for refueling automobiles (GFSA) by the compressorless method and also the development and creation of the basic types of equipment for the AGFCS and GFSA; gas engines and means of transport using natural gas as motor fuel; and equipment for the servicing and maintenance of motor vehicles operating on compressed natural gas.

The AGFCS represents a facility performing two functions: the production of compressed natural gas and the refueling of motor transport proper. For this reason it incorporates a compressor shop with a complex of auxiliary installations such as a natural gas cleaning and drying block, a block for cooling the gas following compression, a power station, a gas-storage system bloc, fuel pumps and bays for the refueling automobiles.

For an increase in the loading factor of the basic equipment of the AGFCS and simultaneously for a reduction in transport's idling during refueling it is proposed creating mobile automobile refueling units representing tractor trailers on whose semitrailers a gas-cylinder installation and gas-refueling unit have been mounted. Up to 50 trucks or 150 passenger automobiles may be refueled given a pressure in the cylinders of 320 atmospheres.

The second method of the use of natural gas as motor fuel is its liquefaction. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a cryogenic liquid with a normal boiling temperature of approximately -162 Centigrade, which predetermines the methods of its production by way of the use of various refrigeration cycles. Special low-temperature installations and storage tanks are required for this. The task is more complex than with the use of compressed gas. However, liquefaction of the gas makes it possible to dispense with heavy steel cylinders.

LNG is currently being used on a large scale in a number of developed capitalist countries. For example, the proportion of LNG in total gas consumption in the West European countries in 1985 will constitute approximately 23 percent, in the United States 22 percent and in Japan 25 percent.

These countries have also accumulated certain experience of the use of LNG as fuel for the engines of automobiles, sea-going ships and helicopters, which shows that the transition of internal combustion engines to LNG does not represent any serious technical and technological difficulties and is economically expedient. The use of LNG, which occupies 640 times less volume than in a gaseous state and has a calorific value of 11,970 kcal (diesel fuel 10,200-10,400 kcal) and an octane rating of 105-107, increases 1.5-2-fold the between-service capacity of the internal combustion engine and halves oil consumption compared with when such an engine operates on oil-based motor fuel.

Besides, the carbon monoxide content in the exhaust gases of engines on LNG is reduced, according to data of the Ford and Air Liquide companies, to 0.2 percent, that is, by a factor of 5-20, of nitric oxides of 3-4 and of unburned hydrocarbons by a factor of 2-3 compared with the use of gasoline.

In connection with the considerable increase in the cost of oil-based motor fuel and to reduce its consumption scientific-technical and practical work has begun in the Soviet Union on the problem of the use of LNG. In the estimation of Soviet specialists expenditure on the production of natural gas channeled into the replacement of fuel oil will in the immediate future (1990) be approximately the same as on the production of gasoline from fuel oil and 3-4 times less than synthetic gasoline from coal.

For the organization of the large-scale production and use of LNG as motor fuel it is necessary:

- a) to create cryogenic installations (plants) for the production of LNG;
- b) to develop and create reservoirs for the isothermic storage of LNG at the gas-liquefaction plants and also at the gas-distribution stations for the refueling of automobiles, diesel engines and river ships;
- c) to create conveyor automobile and railroad cisterns for the shipment of LNG;
- d) to develop and create gas-fueling stations;
- e) to create cryogenic fuel tanks, gas apparatus and engines operating on LNG.

The technical-economic indicators of the gas-liquefaction installations, including specific energy consumption on the production of LNG, largely depend on the technology. Depending on the degree of perfection of the use of the refrigeration cycle and the engineering equipment, the specific consumption of energy on the production of LNG could constitute from 0.35 to 0.8 kilowatt-hour/kilos.

Calculations show that to substitute for 4-5 million tons of gasoline in 1990 it will be necessary to build a number of LNG installations with a capacity of 40,000 to 500,000 tons a year.

The program of scientific-technical cooperation provides for the accomplishment of these tasks on the basis of the interaction of the countries concerned. In particular, use may be made of the experience of the specialized organizations of the USSR accumulated at the time of the planning and construction of large-scale reservoirs for the storage of liquid ammonia and ethylene, while the problem of the storage of LNG directly at the gas-fueling stations may be solved with the use of the experience of the installation of spherical and cylindrical reservoirs for the storage of cryogenic products (liquid nitrogen and oxygen) and also the CSSR's experience in this sphere.

It is also necessary to develop and create systems for filling automobile tanks with supercooled LNG which must exclude the discharge of LNG vapors into the atmosphere and not create additional difficulties when they are serviced.

For the transition of automobiles to LNG it is essential to assimilate the series production of cryogenic fuel tanks for a pressure of up to 5-6 atmospheres from aluminum alloys with high-quality heat insulation and also a system of feeding LNG to the engine. A great deal of work has to be done on switching diesel engines, the relative significance of which is growing increasingly in connection with the dieselization of automotive transport which is under way, to LNG.

Accomplishment of the above tasks will make it possible not only to substitute for a proportion of liquid fuel in short supply with LNG but also appreciably reduce the pollution of the environment with toxic components of the products of the combustion of gasoline and diesel fuel.

LNG may also be used as motor fuel for diesel engines for the purpose of partial substitution for traditional diesel fuel. It would not seem possible to dispense entirely with the use of diesel fuel in railroad transport owing to the singularities of the operating process of gas diesel engines and the substantial proportion of operation of locomotives on partial loads. The transition to LNG of a part of water transport is also of interest.

Tanks like those manufactured for liquid oxygen or nitrogen or those built into the hull of a ship of the methane-tanker tank type may be used on river ships. In respect of ships with a displacement of up to 1,000-5,000 tons the task may be tackled by way of the use of tanks with high-vacuum heat insulation with a capacity of up to 200 cubic meters. Such tanks may be installed horizontally directly on the deck of river ships, and their conversion is thereby simplified.

As a whole, the use of natural gas as motor fuel is promising and efficient. According to preliminary estimates, the use of natural gas as motor fuel in summary volume for the European CEMA countries (excluding the USSR) would make it possible to substitute in the future for a large proportion of their gasoline and diesel fuel needs and thereby reduce oil consumption considerably. Obviously, these countries' participation in the construction of the Yamburg--USSR western border main gas pipeline, which is aimed at supplying them with natural gas, will afford an opportunity for its more extensive use in motor transport and thereby make it possible to ensure economies in motor fuel. The transition of transport to natural gas will also be reflected positively in the development of chemical industry and, thanks to the rational use of natural resources, in the fuel-energy problem as a whole.

Organizational prerequisites within the CEMA framework have been created for the successful solution of the existing problems on a multilateral basis by the joint efforts of the countries concerned. It is essential that the countries' organizations and enterprises embark on the realization of the measures envisaged by the cooperation programs within the agreed times. Proceeding from the General Agreement, the countries which signed it must adopt measures to ensure that the commitments ensuing from realization of the agreement be reflected in the state plans for development of the national economy. The most important measures will be incorporated in the CEMA countries' concerted plans of multilateral integration measures.

The USSR Government has already instructed the country's appropriate ministries and departments to adopt measures for fulfillment of the quotas ensuing from the General Agreement and the cooperation programs.

In accordance with article III of the General Agreement the CEMA Committee for Cooperation in the Sphere of Machine Building and the permanent commissions for cooperation in the sphere of oil and gas industry, transport, chemical industry and ferrous metallurgy are to study and coordinate proposals for the specification and amplification of work and participation therein, including the preparation of multilateral agreements. These bodies must provide in their plans for the coming years for the targets determined for them by the cooperation programs being met on time.

Overall coordination of work within the framework of the said CEMA bodies will be exercised by the CEMA Committee for Cooperation in the Sphere of Planning Activity. There was an exchange of opinions in this connection at the committee's bureau session in September 1985 on an efficient form of coordinating mechanism of the work of the CEMA bodies on realization of the General Agreement and the corresponding decree was adopted, in accordance with which the representatives in the bureau of the countries concerned will render national enterprises and organizations and also their countries' delegations in the above CEMA bodies the necessary assistance in the timely implementation of the measures envisaged by the cooperation programs for compressed and liquified gas. The committee bureau will annually in the first quarter as of 1986 examine information concerning the progress of realization of the General Agreement prepared by the CEMA Secretariat on the basis of the available material of the CEMA bodies for the purpose of coordinating, at CEMA Committee for Cooperation in the Sphere of Planning Activity Level, the questions which arise.

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SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND CEMA AFFAIRS

CEMA COOPERATION IN MICROELECTRONICS

Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV in Russian
No 10, Oct 85 pp 62-64

[Article by Vsevolod Amontov of the CEMA Secretariat: "The General Agreement in Action"]

[Text] The basis of modern electronic componentry determining its main content is currently microelectronics. Its successes are determining the development of scientific-technical progress in the most important areas, primarily in those such as computers, data collection, processing and transmission systems, technical means of the automation of production and control, scientific research and services. Training systems in many spheres are being perfected on the basis of the use of microelectronics. Microelectronics and technical facilities based thereon are penetrating man's social life in ever increasing depth, facilitating housework and enriching leisure time. The creation, production and use of PC's--individual portable computers--are being developed extensively. The accomplishment of tasks of an appreciable growth of productivity and an alleviation of labor, economies in energy, raw material and intermediate products, an increase in the quality of the product and services and an intensification of the national economy as a whole is impossible without the extensive introduction of microelectronics. In its development microelectronics has traveled a path which has been short in terms of the solution of complex problems from discrete semiconductor instruments (diodes and transistors) to very large-scale integrated microcircuits accommodating on a single crystal of approximately 1 square centimeter hundreds of thousands of elements.

The rate of development of microelectronics, which is the basis of modern electronic componentry, and its extensive application and great significance for the acceleration of scientific-technical progress and also the imperialist countries' discriminatory measures in trade and technical exchange have made necessary the expansion and intensification of the CEMA countries' cooperation in this sphere and the improvement of its organization.

An important step in the accomplishment of this task was the signing in July 1981 during the 35th meeting of the CEMA Session of the General Agreement on multilateral cooperation in the sphere of the creation of a uniform standardized base of electronic engineering products, special engineering equipment and semiconductor and special materials for their production among Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, the Republic of Cuba, Poland, Romania, the USSR and the CSSR.

The main purpose of the realization of this agreement is complete satisfaction of the CEMA countries' need for products of modern electronic equipment, particularly microelectronics, and also the special engineering equipment and materials needed for their creation and production. Cooperation in realization of the agreement is being practiced in accordance with the decision of the CEMA members' communist and workers parties.

A considerable amount of work has been done since the signing of the General Agreement by the participating countries within the framework of the CEMA Permanent Commission for Cooperation in the Sphere of Radio Engineering and Electronics Industry and the Intergovernmental Commission for the Socialist Countries' Cooperation in the Sphere of Computers and also the CEMA permanent commissions for cooperation in the sphere of chemical industry, nonferrous metallurgy and others. The starting point therein was the agreement on a common approach to the formation of the product list of the Uniform Standardized Base of Electronic Engineering Products of the CEMA Countries (USB EEP).

In world practice the list of products of electronic engineering, including microelectronics, is very extensive. Proceeding from technical and economic criteria, the electronic engineering list of products within the framework of the CEMA countries' cooperation must be sufficient for tackling an entire range of technical tasks connected with their use, but must not here permit unwarranted superfluity, that is, must be standardized and uniform for all countries of the community.

For compliance with such an important requirement the Procedural Principles of the Formation of the Product List of the USB EEP, which define its purpose and content, formation criteria and procedure and the procedure of its operation, amendment and amplification, were drawn up.

Specified lists of the special engineering equipment and special, particularly pure, materials needed for the creation and manufacture of electronic engineering products were drawn up also and the state of the latter's production and the degree of satisfaction of requirements therein were analyzed as the initial stage.

The USB EEP Product List was formed on the basis of the claim lists of the sectors which are the most important consumers of these products and the adopted Procedural Principles. With regard for the permanent nature of the replacement of electronic componentry and its constant conformity to the modern requirements and level of development of science and technology the Procedural Principles determined the procedure for systematic amplification of the product list with newly developed products.

Currently the USB EEP Product List encompasses many hundred thousand electronic engineering products. Its main, determining content is the section incorporating the groups and classes of integrated microcircuits necessary in multilateral cooperation primarily for computers, means of the automation of production and control, communications and robotics. This section incorporates a wide range of various-function logic (digital) integrated microcircuits pertaining to different circuit engineering fields. These include bipolar integrated microcircuits based on transistor-transistor logic, high-speed and economical transistor-transistor logic integrated microcircuits with Schottky diodes, very high-speed integrated circuits with emitter communications and unipolar metal-dielectric semiconductor and supereconomical complementary metal-dielectric semiconductor integrated microcircuits.

The section incorporates various-purpose analog integrated microcircuits such as secondary power sources, operational amplifiers, comparators and commutators and also digital-analog and analog-digital transformers and an individual class of interface integrated microcircuits.

The Product List contains an extensive selection of large-scale and very large-scale memory (store) integrated microcircuits with a wide range of capacity and different memory organization and various architectural-structural treatment and word length.

Hardware development engineers have the possibility of choice of integrated microcircuits of various functions depending on the main demand made of them-- economical operation (low level of consumption of capacity), speed and other parameters or a certain combination of the corresponding demands.

In parallel with the formation of the USB EEP Product List work has been performed on the fullest satisfaction of the need for the electronic engineering products included on the Product List, primarily within the framework of the current agreements on multilateral international production specialization, which are supplemented systematically. In the overwhelming majority of cases the countries' need for these products is catered for by mutual supplies on the basis of agreements concluded between industrial organizations of the participants in the General Agreement. For example, in the sphere of microelectronics the proportion of such products constitutes 86 percent. In respect of radio parts and components this indicator is lower since the need for many products of this group is being satisfied in the countries thanks to their domestic production.

It should be noted that the greater the extent to which in the development of new and the modernization of the existing equipment electrical engineering products included on the standardized Product List (with regard for its systematic amplification with newly developed products) are used, the higher the technical-economic results from realization of the General Agreement.

In tackling the tasks ensuing from the General Agreement the countries have performed a great deal of work to meet their needs for the special engineering equipment and special, particularly pure, materials needed for the production of

products of electronic engineering, primarily microelectronics. But there is still much work to be done. Thus the transition to technology providing for the possibility of a considerable rise in the degree of integration of very large-scale integrated microcircuits demands joint, concerted efforts in the creation and organization of the production of new special engineering equipment, high-resolution lithographic equipment, for example.

The adoption of additional measures and additional efforts also are needed to cater fully for the need for special, particularly pure, materials both in terms of the Product List and in a quantitative respect.

Both the results which have been achieved and the tasks not yet fully accomplished were the subject of study at the 110th meeting of the CEMA Executive Committee in June 1984. The corresponding decisions were adopted. It was emphasized, in particular, that a further intensification of cooperation in production specialization and also the accelerated development of promising electronic engineering products, special engineering equipment and special materials were essential in the interests of fuller satisfaction of the CEMA members' need for electronic engineering products (with regard for their constant growth).

The proposals agreed in the course of coordination of the plans for the development of the CEMA countries' radio engineering and electronics industry for specialization in 1986-1990 within the framework of the Agreement on Multilateral International Specialization and Cooperation of the Development and Production of Groups (Series) of Semiconductor Instruments and Integrated Microcircuits are reason to speak of a further considerable broadening and intensification of specialization in this sphere.

The total number of types of integrated microcircuits and semiconductor instruments embraced by this agreement for 1986-1990 constitutes several hundred items and will have increased 35 percent compared with 1981-1985. The proportion of products of concern to three and more countries will increase from 44 to 78 percent. The proportion of products in which four and more countries have an interest here will amount to 55 percent instead of 20 percent. This graphically confirms the process of the extension of production specialization in this sphere, basically thanks to the new, promising and most intricate microelectronics products from among those included on the USB EEP Product List.

Average annual reciprocal supplies in accordance with this agreement will also grow 30 percent in 1986-1990. They will amount to many tens of millions.

Many new integrated microcircuits created in accordance with the multilateral plan for scientific-technical cooperation, since the signing of the General Agreement included, are included among the specialized products.

The plan of scientific-technical cooperation for 1986-1990 also includes the development of more than 100 new types of promising integrated microcircuits and optical-electronic instruments. This plan will be supplemented systematically,

and the new products created in accordance therewith will expand and update the regularly amplified USB EEP Product List.

The concerted proposals for the specialization on a multilateral basis of the production of special engineering equipment for the manufacture of electronic engineering products in 1986-1990 provide for reciprocal supplies of many types of such intricate equipment as ion alloying plants, the chemical treatment of microchips and precipitation, an epitaxy device, automated equipment for measuring the parameters of semiconductor structures on the chip and finished products and so forth.

A considerable amount of work has been done on the organization of multilateral cooperation to satisfy the CEMA countries' need for special materials for the production of electronic engineering products, primarily of microelectronics. The specialized production of an extensive list of materials corresponding to the strict demands of electronic engineering is being organized or extended. It encompasses metals of high purity and particular physical properties, chemical agents and particularly pure chemical substances (gases, solvents, etching agents, [dotiruyushchiye] substances), photochemical materials, special plastics, varnishes and paints.

The tasks encompassed by the General Agreement are being tackled by the countries on a bilateral basis also. The results of such work are in many cases subsequently used by other countries cooperating on a multilateral basis. The creation by the joint efforts of GDR and USSR specialists of photo-lithographic apparatus corresponding to the highest demands and also equipment for electronic lithography developed jointly by CSSR and USSR specialists may serve as an example.

A convincing illustration of the impact of the results of bilateral mutual relations on the development of multilateral cooperation is the assimilation in Hungary of the engineering equipment and licenses for the production of integrated microcircuits purchased in the USSR.

Their manufacture, which began in April 1984, was an important stage in and essentially the start of realization of the program for the development of electronics industry in the country approved by the Hungarian Government. At the same time this is creating good prerequisites for the growth of Hungary's participation in the division of labor in multilateral cooperation. Thus even at this stage the number of types of integrated microcircuits in terms of which Hungary will in 1986-1990 be a specialist country supplying them to the other countries concerned is almost four times more than in 1981-1985. The integrated microcircuits exported by Hungary will, correspondingly, more than double. Thus the combination and close linkage of bilateral and multilateral cooperation are important conditions of the successful accomplishment of the tasks envisaged by the General Agreement.

The top-level CEMA economic conference in June 1984 in Moscow emphasized the paramount significance of the development of electronics and the need for particular attention to the extension and intensification of cooperation in this sphere. Realization of the General Agreement continues.

Under the conditions of the modern scientific-technical revolution paramount, fundamental significance is attached to the time taken to solve scientific-technical problems which arise and to new scientific ideas being brought to the level of their practical use. A considerable time reduction is achieved in many cases, particularly when it is a question of composite problems at the intersection of different technical directions and fields, by the creative unification of the efforts of many scientists both nationally and internationally. A striking example of such unification is the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in Dubno (USSR). For this reason using an acceptable form of the direct unification of the efforts of the scientists and specialists of the countries concerned could also prove justified and expedient for solution of selected problems in the sphere of microelectronics incorporated in the draft Comprehensive Program of the CEMA Countries' Scientific-Technical Progress for 15-20 Years and connected with the continued realization of the General Agreement.

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WORK OF AFGHANISTAN'S PRIMARY PARTY ORGANS DISCUSSED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 12-14

[Article by V. Baykov: "A Cause for a Whole Life"]

[Excerpts] "I think that Fazlolla deserves to become a party member. He is well thought of in the collective."

"I agree with you. I can vote in favor of his candidacy with a clear conscience."

This conversation took place in the party committee of the Dzhangalak Automotive Repair Plant between Vasya Korgar and Isak Divanyar--the secretary of the local party organization of the National Democratic Party of Afghanistan and his deputy. A couple of minutes ago an application lay on the secretary's desk: "I ask that you accept me as a member of the PDPA, defending, the interests of the workers. I wish to work to help the party and the people defend the conquests of the April Revolution and build a new life. I have become familiar with the party regulations and program and agree with all of their points."

In carrying out party decisions its local organizations devote a great deal of attention to the growth of its ranks. Leading workers and employees, peasants, fighters in the Afghan army, and the intelligentsia, rallied around the goals and tasks of the PDPA, are augmenting its ranks. Analyzing the results of the work done since the time of the general party conference (March 1982), the organ of the Central Committee of the PDPA--the newspaper KHAKIKITE INKILABE SAUR (Truth of the April Revolution) wrote that in 1983 alone the number of people in the party increased by almost 32,000.

"On the eve of the party revolution the party ranks included 18,000 members," the chief of the accounting sector of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Vasel, told me, "and now it includes more than 130,000 members and candidates."

"There are many who wish to link their destiny to the party," continued M. Vasel. "But we are not forcing the growth of its ranks. Our main task is to improve their qualitative composition and develop politically literate reinforcements. Workers and peasants comprise more than half of those

entering the party. In order to raise their ideological level we have organized offices of political education and courses for political workers. There are many people studying in courses to eliminate illiteracy."

In order to become familiar with the work of the lower party organizations and the problems they encounter in their daily work, I went to the Fifth Kabul Raykom of the PDPA. The first secretary, Khabibur Rakhman, said that last year 292 people were accepted into the party. For a rayon which occupies the northwestern outskirts of the city, where there are no industrial enterprises and, consequently, there is no significant proletarian segment, where 90 percent of the residents are unable to read and write, this is a fairly good indicator.

"How do we prepare the young party members?" Kh. Rakhman repeated my question. "First of all, the local party organizations are responsible for their training. Each of them has a clear program of work in this area. Those who enter the party go through candidates' probation: workers, peasants and soldiers--a half-year; the rest--a year. During this time at special seminars they study party documents and the most important decisions of the government of Afghanistan. The highest level of study are the courses in political literacy. There are 18 of them in our rayon.

Each month the bureau of the raykom analyzes the state of affairs in the local areas. Our experienced comrades, the propagandists, work with everyone who wishes to enter the party--whether they be an advanced worker, an employee or an activist of the youth organization. We do not conceal the fact, especially from youth, that membership in the party does not give any privileges to anyone, but, on the contrary, places on them a greater degree of responsibility, especially now when our party is experiencing a difficult period and is fighting against internal and external reaction.

The uniqueness of party building in Afghanistan consists primarily in the fact that it is taking place in a poorly developed country, under the conditions of the unceasing intrigues of counterrevolution and undeclared war waged from without. The party has sent its best personnel to the places and the provinces where propaganda work is being conducted to draw the majority of people over to the side of the revolution, in order to implement the extensive program of socioeconomic transformations that has been proclaimed by the popular authorities. Speaking at the first nationwide conference of the PDPA, the general secretary of the party Central Committee, chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, announced: "The PDPA has become the core of the new revolutionary sociopolitical system in Afghanistan and its leading and directive force. It is the organization that expresses the interests of the workers, peasants and all other workers in our country and joins them together because it is armed with progressive revolutionary theory and because it is developing a political line, strategy and tactics for fighting for a happy future for our beloved homeland."

It was not easy to attain such a leading position in the society.

For a better understanding of the objective conditions under which the NDPA has to operate, suffice it simply to recall the fact that in Afghanistan at

the present time, according to official figures, of the approximately 15 million residents only about 150,000 are workers, who are just beginning to be formed as a class, and the majority of the population is illiterate. The uniqueness of the conditions consists in that the majority of residents belonged to the Muslim faith and the Afghan society has a complicated national and tribal structure.

The PDPA is in favor of retaining national differences and religious traditions. This contributes to mutual understanding with the Muslim clergy. Last year more than 50 million afghanis were spent just for the restoration of mosques that had been destroyed by bandits. But, of course, first and foremost respect for religious customs and guaranteed freedom of belief--this is what leads to improvement of relations between the influential Muslim clergy and the PDPA and the revolutionary agencies of power. The same thing can be said about the tribes and tribal alliances, which are understanding more and more clearly that the government in Kabul is their ally in the fight against counterrevolutionaries who are engaged in extortion, robbery and murder. In the jirgas--meetings of tribal members--they are declaring their readiness to cooperate with the revolutionary power and independently defend the territory on which they live. To this should be added also the numerous meetings of eminent activists of the PDPA and the Afghan government was the senior members of the tribes who are helping to eliminate misunderstanding and strengthen the confidence of the tribes in the government and its undertakings. During the second half of 1984 alone Babrak Karmal met with delegations of representatives of the tribes from the Pandshir and Andarap valleys and the province of Kapisa.

The influence and authority of the PDPA are constantly increasing. This is shown by the creation in recent years of hundreds of new party cells and local party organizations. Success has been achieved in strengthening the unity and solidarity of the party. But it would be incorrect to say that the PDPA is not experiencing difficulties. It is not so easy to eradicate from the consciousness of the people the modes of thought and behavior that have been inherited from the past and were generated by outdated socioeconomic relations. This, of course, makes the activity of the PDPA more difficult. It also happens that in certain party organizations remnants of fractionism appear once in a while.

The 14th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA held in September of 1984 was a remarkable phenomenon of intraparty life. On the agenda were questions of essentially increasing the role of party committees and organizations and their responsibility for the state of affairs in the local areas. It directed the entire party to solving the most important problem--expanding and strengthening the positions of the PDPA and of revolutionary power among the masses of people and enlisting them in the process of the development of the April Revolution.

During the course of the implementation of the program of action adopted by the PDPA, more and more broad masses of workers and various classes and social segments are being drawn in to the progressive transformation democratic transformations. Leading representatives of workers and employees, peasants and servicemen in the Afghan army are linking their destiny to the party. "I

request that you accept me into the ranks of the PDPA," declare many Afghan patriots like Fazlolla. Half of those who are entering the party are under 30 years of age. Afghan youth are drawn to the PDPA--the vanguard of the workers. And herein lies a guarantee of the great force of the party and its influence among the masses.

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HISTORICAL ACCOUNT SCORES ZIONIST COLONIZATION OF PALESTINE

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 22-25

[Article by D. Prokofyev, candidate of philological sciences: "The Great Robbery of the Palestinians"]

[Text] When we are intending to capture this land should we not immediately ask ourselves what will happen to the Fellahin whose fields we have purchased. From the standpoint of the divergence between morality and official legality we look quite righteous, but unless we deceive ourselves we must admit that we are depriving the unfortunate people of what little property they have and of the food from their mouth.

--SHILOAH, Jerusalem, 16, No 3,
Tishrey Tarsakh.¹

These words were written in 1907. The author of the article in the magazine SHILOAH, Isaac Epstein drew attention to the question which determined the outcome of the Near East conflict--a military and political conflict which was one of the longest and dangerous for the modern world in our day: why and how did the Zionist colonizers deprive the indigent Palestinian population of its legitimate national rights and transform the people into refugees, and how did the Palestinian problem arise?

Zionist Mythology

Zionist propaganda has created an entire system of sociohistorical myths which are intended to distort the true nature of the problem. These myths, which are widespread in bourgeois historical science, have one goal: to "prove" that there is no Palestinian problem, that it has been invented by certain mysterious "Muslim extremists" who are constantly inciting the Arabs against the Jews, and if the Palestinian Arabs understood the "civilizing mission" of the Zionists, peace and quiet and abundance would reign in the country,.

The most straightforward and primitive Zionist myth in this area is the idea that by the time of the beginning of Zionist immigration to Palestine this country was--in the words of the founder of Zionism, Herzl--"a country without

a people," an empty desert where the entire population was composed of several tens of thousands of believers who had settled around the holy places, and small tribes of Bedouin nomads. The Arabs, according to the Zionists, appeared out of neighboring countries when the Jews began to develop the Palestinian economy and created good conditions for employment and earning on the plane. Thus there is no Palestinian people and, consequently, there is no Palestinian problem.²

The groundlessness of such assertions can easily be demonstrated with factual evidence. At the end of the 19th century there were 600,000 people living in Palestine, including 500,000 Arabs.³ They were certainly not "Bedouin nomads" --more than 75 percent of the population included in the census were employed in farming, that is, they were settled population.⁴ As for the idea that the Arabs immigrated here during the first decades of the 20th century--here one can give data concerning the dynamics of the growth of the Arab population of Palestine since the beginning of the century and up until World II. The average annual rate of this growth amounted to 3.8 percent--approximately as much as in the neighboring Syria and Egypt. The conclusion: the Arab population of Palestine increased as a result of natural growth, and not because of immigration. For comparison let us point out that the growth of the Jewish population, which was indeed stimulated to a considerable degree by immigration, amounted to 9.7 percent per year during this period.

But in the stock of Zionist propaganda there is one more myth, which is developed considerably more skillfully. It "asserts that in general it makes no difference whether the Arabs were in Palestine or how many of them there were," Israeli economist Shlomo Frenkl writes regarding this, "since the Jewish sector developed of its own accord, practically separately from the Arab population." This being the case, it again turns out that the Zionist leadership bears no responsibility for the appearance of the Palestinian problem: the Jewish and Arab sectors exist separately from one another and if the Arabs suddenly end up without any land and without any means of existence in Palestine, the people in charge of the Jewish sector--Zionist organizations --have nothing to do with this.

But this myth too collapses when compared with the facts. The Jewish sector in Palestine not only maintained active ties with the Arab sector, but even depended on it almost completely. At the beginning of the 20th century the majority of Jewish settlements used exclusively Arab labor force, and even the land acquired by the Jews was worked largely by Arab day laborers.⁵ And even in the 1930's, when the Jewish sector already had 350,000 people and a significant economic base by the Palestinian standard, its dependence on the Arab sector was still significant. This same Sh. Frenkl notes that "a large part of the food consumed by the Jewish sector was produced by Arabs. Thousands of Arabs worked for Jewish businessmen in agriculture and industry. Thus in 1936 63.3 percent of the workers on the citrus plantations (the main branch of agriculture in Palestine during those years) were Arabs. Arabs also comprised 42.2 percent of the construction workers in the Jewish sector of Jerusalem during that same year."

The myths created by the Zionists exert an appreciable influence on the work of bourgeois historians concerning problems of the Near East in recent times.

In any event, not a single one of them even mentions the fact that the entire history of Zionist colonization of Palestine (a process which did not end in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel, but has continued up to the present day in occupied territories)--this is a history of crowding the indigenous population out of the country and depriving them of their human rights and means of existence. It is a history of a great robbery of the Palestinians.

The process of crowding out the Palestinian Arabs is usually linked to the appearance of the problem of refugees during the time of war in 1948. But in reality this process developed much earlier--from the very beginning of Zionist colonization, at the turn of the century. There was never any free land in Palestine: all sections that were suitable for cultivation were being used. The assimilation of new land required immense capital investments. This was undertaken on a large scale after the state of Israel was formed, and then we are speaking primarily about adapting for Jewish farming the land that had previously served for Arab extensive cattle raising, that is, again we are speaking about crowding out the Arabs.

If one were to take the "Atlas of the History of Palestine," published in Jerusalem in 1972,⁶ one would see before one's eyes an idyllic picture of the flourishing of the Palestinian land since the beginning of Zionist colonization: during the 19th century on the map they have indicated only a couple dozen cities and villages, and then in the empty space Jewish settlements appear one after the other. But all one need do is look at any other map of Palestine at the beginning of the century and it becomes clear that these settlements appear in the places of Arab villages and cities, which were destroyed by the colonists in one way or another. All the large population points (except for Tel Aviv) created in Palestine during the half-century appeared over the ruins of Arab villages: Petah Tiqva--in the place of the village of Mulabbis, Rishon Le Ziyon--in the place of the village of Zammardin, Rosh Pinna--in the place of the village of Al-Junah, and so forth. The entire city of Saffuriya, which at the beginning of the century competed in size with what is now the largest Arab city in Israel, Nazareth, was erased from the face of the earth, and in its place there appeared the Jewish settlement of Zippori.

A Country Without a People?

Was the "great robbery of the Palestinians" a deliberate goal, the result of an evil design of the Zionist leaders, or was this a spontaneous process which arose in compliance with the internal logic of the development of Zionist colonization? Are we speaking about a "tragic mistake" of the Zionist leadership (the point of view of E. Eliyashar, U. Avneri and other liberal bourgeois researchers) or did the appearance of the Zionists in Palestine inevitably lead to a crowding out of the country's indigenous population?

Zionist leaders called Palestine a "country without a people." This was not hypocrisy nor an attempt to conceal their intentions behind an absurd myth, but a complete and in its own way integrated model of a myth which was based on the purely imperialist idea of the very concept of a "people." A "country without a people" in the understanding of Herzl, Weizman and others like them

--is not necessarily a desert without any people: it is a country without a "civilized people"--without any capitalist economy, without any of the customary attributes of the "European way of life." As proof one can simply refer to the fact that for the Zionist leaders another "country without a people" was the southern part of Argentina (populated by Indians), where they initially intended to create the Jewish state. This same Herzl, and especially the leader of the English Zionists Zangwill, supported a plan for Zionist colonization of Uganda which was proposed in 1903 by Great Britain: the argument was exactly the same--a "country without a people."⁷

What about the Zionist leaders in Palestine itself, face to face with the people of the "country without a people"? They were imbued with the imperialist idea of the "insignificance" of peoples of poorly developed countries. Typical in this respect is an evaluation given in the 1930's of the process of the Zionists' crowding out the Palestinians by someone who seemed to be one of the most liberal Zionist figures at the time, Elijah Shar: "Such is the way the world is built: new discoveries make old instruments unnecessary, the physician comes to replace the sorcerer, the steamship crowds out the sailing ship, the motor vehicle crowds out the ass, and the electric lamp crowds out the kerosene lamp."⁸

The very project of colonizing Palestine appeared to the Zionists primarily as a step on the path of advancement of "Europe" toward the East. That same Herzl, who is not inclined to diplomatic formulations, declared when speaking at the 2nd Zionist Congress in 1898 that Palestine was important primarily "for Europe," since it makes it possible to solve the central "diplomatic problem of the next decade--Asia." He expressed himself even more candidly in 1900, at the 4th Zionist Congress: "Our appearance in the country of our ancestors...is primarily of historical interest for powers who have the same interests in Asia.... The civilized countries have become increasingly interested in making sure that on the path to Asia they have created a stronghold of culture for the good of all civilized people. This stronghold is Eretz Ysrael, the country of Israel."⁹

By what path could the Jewish penetration into Palestine have proceeded if the leaders of Zionism had considered it from the very beginning to be a process of creating a foreign body in the very center of the Near East? Only one--the path of colonialism. Thus they made neither carefully concealed secret plans nor the "traditional mistakes." The "great robbery of the Palestinians" was not born of the evil design of one leader or another. It was the result of the primarily imperialist character of Zionism.

First "The Land Was Taken"

Official Israeli historiography explains the development of events in the country as follows.¹⁰

1. First there appeared the idea of "conquest through labor": the newly arrived immigrants set as their goal to create a Jewish working class and a Jewish peasantry.

2. Hence follows the idea of "conquest or defense": the workers and peasants want to provide for the safety of the Jewish farms with their own hands, since in the Ottoman empire, of which Palestine was a part up until World War I, the state authority was weak and could not cope with the attacks of the Bedouin nomads.

3. And, finally, the idea of "conquest through the land": previously the land on which the Jewish workers and peasants worked belonged to large landowners, but now they wanted to work their own land and appealed to Zionist organizations to purchase sections for cooperative settlements.

It seemed like a well-arranged and consistent system (if, to be sure, one leaves to the side the doubtful issue of where the workers and peasants got the idea of providing for the "security of the Jewish farm" when they did not have any land of their own but were working for rich farmers). But the facts immediately cast doubt on this. In reality they first began to carry out the "takeover of the land," and after this "the takeover of protection" and only then came the "takeover of labor." An insignificant detail, but it completely destroys the "progressive" arguments of the Zionists ("The workers and peasants wanted..." "The workers and peasants carried out..."). The "three takeovers" were carried out not at all by the workers and not by the peasants (although it was partially through their efforts).

The "takeover of the land" began as early as the end of the 19th century. In 1882 Jews lived in Palestine in 22 population points and owned 60,000 dunams of land (a dunam equals 0.1 hectares). A large part of this land was in cities: 38,000 dunams were the property of religious Jews who had lived from ancient times in the "four holy cities"--Jerusalem, Zefat, Teverya and Hebron.¹¹ And in 1914 the Jews already 47 population points here (the way the new ones were created is discussed above) and 440,000 dunams of land.

Some of the land, especially at first, was acquired by private individuals--rich Jews who purchased citrus plantations. These purchases exerted no influence on the structure of employment: the new owners, like the previous ones, exploited the Arab peasants and the agricultural workers. But then there was a considerable increase in the acquisition of land by Zionist organizations for colonial purposes. In 1901 on the basis of a decision of the 5th Zionist Congress, the Jewish National Fund (Qeren Qayemet) was created especially for purchasing Palestinian land, which would be "owned for eternity by the Jewish people."¹² The acquisitions of the Qeren Qayemet already had quite different socioeconomic consequences: on this land it was intended to use the labor of Jewish immigrants.

The main partners of the Zionist organizations in their transactions with the immobile population were the "efendi"--large feudal landowners, the majority of whom lived outside of Palestine. They owned the land on which dozens of Arab villages were located and tens of thousands of tenant fellahs worked. The Qeren Qayemet paid money for the land to the feudal himself--with the condition that he would dissolve previous rent agreements. This was an agreement between two plunderers: the bureaucrats from the Qeren Qayemet were well aware that the renters would simply be driven out of the villages by an order of the all-powerful feudal lord.

The situation was even simpler when it came to purchasing state land: in this case the transaction was concluded with the representative of the Ottoman authorities who also took on the responsibility of "purging" the land of Arab peasants. Usually a police order was enough, but sometimes troops were called in.

As a result of this kind of purely colonial transactions, a segment of a kind of rural lumpen proletariat appeared and grew rapidly in Palestine. E. Eliyashar admitted that the fellahs who were driven from their land were left without anyplace to live or any means of existence. Actually they had only two ways of acquiring food: they could either hire out as farm laborers to the new settlers or they could steal from them.

In order to eliminate both of these possibilities, the Zionist leadership began to think about "takeover of protection." Here concern for how the Arabs would become tenants of the Jews was even stronger than the concern of the Jewish settlers for protecting their storehouses. The Zionist leaders were not interested in transforming the Jews into a small class of owners of farms on which "natives" worked: this would sharply limit the possibilities of the immigration of Jews into Palestine and would threaten Zionism itself. The Hashomer organization created in 1909 for "takeover of protection" was called upon to protect Jewish settlements not only and not so much from "Bedouin nomads" as from Arab workers. One of the leaders of the organization, Israel Shohet, wrote candidly about this: "In essence Jewish workers came after we did to settle. In the population point that was turned over for protection of the Hashomer the labor was moved from the hands of the Arabs to the hands of the Jews."¹³

But there will have to be a special discussion of the "takeover of labor." As for the process of the "takeover of the land," it continued with new force after the introduction of the regime of the British mandate.

Even in the first decade of the 20th century one of the Zionist leaders Dr Arthur Ruplin founded the "Palestine administration" of the World Zionist Organization (WOZO) whose functions included using the money gathered by Zionists in Europe and America for investments in Palestine. The creation of the mandate opened up unlimited possibilities for Ruplin. True, the British were not ready to encourage the development of local industry (on the contrary, Palestine interested them as a market for the sale of British products)--but they permitted the free purchase of land and the development of agriculture. And this became the natural area for the investments of the money of the WZO. Jewish land ownership had increased by 1923 to 594,000 dunams, and by 1936 it reached 1,392,000 dunams. And there was also an increase in the proportion of "national lands" (belonging in one way or another to the WZO)--from 4 percent in 1914 to 26 percent by 1936.¹⁴

Between 1918 and 1929 the Zionist organizations acquired from these same "efendi" immense areas of land: 'Emeq Yizre'el (in the triangle of Haifa-Akko-Nazareth), 'Emeq Hasharon (between Tel Aviv and Haifa) and large areas around Tel Aviv. In 1929-1936 they added to this 'Emeq Hula (from Lake Tiberius to Metulla in the north), regions to the south of Haifa and between

'Emeq Yizre'el and 'Emeq Hasharon. At the same time the privately owned areas also expanded. Arab peasants were losing more and more of their land and being left without a means of existence.

"Jews! Do Not Buy From the Arabs!"

Zionist penetration into Palestine was a typically colonial enterprise. Although the goals and forms of colonialization differed from the traditional ones and came closer to the colonization of the "Indian territories" in the United States or the colonization of the south of Africa by the Boers. The colonization took place not for the sake of the interests of the mother country, but primarily on behalf of the interests of the colonists themselves. The utilization of "natives" as an inexpensive labor force was not the main task of the colonizing enterprise. The Zionists were trying to redirect into Palestine as many Jews as possible and to integrate them into the local economy. And there were only two means of doing this: expanding the economic possibilities of Palestine and crowding the "natives" out of the country's economy. Both of these possibilities were utilized to the maximum, but if the British stood in the way of the expansion of Palestine's capabilities in industry, the program for "replacing" the Arabs with Jewish immigrants in Palestinian agriculture was carried out without any obstacles. This program was given the name "takeovers of labor."

Actually, the "takeover of labor" as one of the goals of Zionist expansion was proclaimed soon after the beginning of the "takeover of the land" and practically at the same time as the "takeover of protection." In 1908 the first organization was created for achieving this goal--Hapo'el Hatza'ir. One of its founders, Joseph Vitkin, made it clear how he would arrange the activity of the organization. "The Hapo'el Hatza'ir," he wrote, "is obliged to carry out the takeover of labor through taking over the land and inhabiting it. Here is necessary to keep in mind that Jewish settlement will be carried out on clearly designated commercial and colonial bases."¹⁵

But for a long time the Zionist leadership did not have a suitable instrument for these colonial acts: after all, this required some significant masses of workers who were completely under the jurisdiction of the Zionists. Moreover, the "takeover of labor" was disadvantageous to the Jewish employers in Palestine: they were quite satisfied with the "takeover of the land" and were in no hurry to employ Jews instead of day laborers who were satisfied with beggars' wages.

The first task--the creation in Palestine of a broad segment of Jewish workers controlled by Zionist organizations--was carried out in the 1920's in the first half of the 1930's. The events in Europe as a whole were favorable for the plans of the Zionists to attract as many Jews as possible to Palestine: first there was the White Guard terror and the Petlyura pogroms during the civil war in Russia and then the anti-Semitic excesses in bourgeois Poland during the 1920's and, finally, fascism in Germany. The Zionists have always been able to take advantage of the outbreaks of anti-Semitism and they did not conceal the fact that without the persecutions of the Jews their own program had little chance of success.

The General Association of Jewish Workers in Palestine (Histadrut) was created in 1920. It was a trade union center which two large parties of the social democratic right reigned supreme--the Hapo'el Hatza'ir and the Ahdut Ha'avoda. The Histadrut turned out to be an ideal instrument for the "takeover of labor"--more precisely, it was adapted to accomplish precisely this task. "From the very beginning," writes S. Frenkl, whom we have already quoted, "the Histadrut was not a trade union organization in the usual sense of the word. Its main task was not to defend the interests of the workers or to fight for socialism...." The Histadrut leaders, "to be sure, sometimes took advantage of socialist and even Marxist slogans, but even they could not conceal their true views. Chaim Arlosoroff called this an "irrelevant class war," Berl Katzenelson--"constructive socialism," and Ben-Gurion--a process of changing over from "class to people." All of them saw in the Histadrut an instrument in the service of the Zionist movement.

The creation of a trade union center under the control of the Zionists opened up considerable possibilities for the "takeover of labor." This was reflected first and foremost in agriculture, in the creation of cooperative settlements--kibbutzim and moshavim. Their organizational principles, which prohibited the utilization of hired labor, were intended to exclude Arab labor on the land that had been purchased by Zionist organizations. From 1918 through 1936 the growth of the Jewish agricultural sector was provided almost exclusively through the cooperative settlements: they created 43 kibbutzim and 68 moshavim. At the same time only 14 agricultural settlements were created on the basis of individual private property (as distinct from the collective private property of the cooperatives)--not because there were no people who desired them, but because the Zionist leadership did not allow such forms of "takeover of the land," which would not be accompanied by a "takeover of labor."

The same process took place in industry. The Histadrut created a so-called "workers' company"--the Hevrat 'ovdim, which began to organize the enterprises in a whole number of branches of industry and services. In 1924 the Solel Bone construction concern was created, and after that the Hamashbir Hamerkazi sales and delivery company and the Megorot plants in Tel Aviv, the Eshlag enterprises of the chemical industry, the Eged transportation cooperative and so forth. Only members of this organization participated at enterprises of Histadrut. Arabs were forbidden to enter them.

But creating a cooperative sector that was "purged of Arabs" was only a part of the matter of the "takeover of labor." This sector provided only 20 percent of the jobs. The main task was to crowd the Arabs out of the private sector as much as possible.

One cannot say that the Zionist ideologists did not try to influence the entrepreneurs by the methods of persuasion. Even during World War II Moshe Smilyansky wrote that Jewish employers should overcome the "moral inability to rise above their own calculations and understand that there exist expenditures which are in fact incomes." But it is extremely doubtful that it would be possible to actually influence the private entrepreneurs with exhortations and cause them to forgo their profit: the labor of the Arabs was still much cheaper.

But then the propaganda apparatus of Histadrut took the matter up. The goal was to stir up the Jewish workers against the Arabs, to force them also to participate in the "great robbery of the Palestinians." The task of the right-wing social democrats was facilitated by the fact that the formation of the Jewish working class had only begun and that it had been formed under the tutelage of the Zionists. No small role here was played by the language and cultural barriers between the Jewish immigrants and the Arabs. And, finally, the achievement of mutual class understanding was impeded by the Zionist indoctrination of the majority of immigrants--the same factor which caused them to end up in Palestine.

In the second half of the 1920's the economy of Palestine entered a stage of crisis. Thousands of workers were left without a means of existence in the cities. At the same time the need for a rural proletariat was increasing: the citrus orchards planted on the land purchased by the Jews (mainly the private sector) were beginning to produce harvests. Histadrut opened up a campaign for expelling the Arab workers. In the winter of 1927 the "Workers' Council" of Petah Tiqva created special patrols to prevent the Arabs from working. There were cases in which the Palestinians were driven from the plantation over the protests of the employers.

At the same time a mass campaign was beginning under the title "Purchase National Goods." Its official goal was to fight against the economic crisis, but in practice it meant a boycott of Arab products by the Jews. Pamphlets appeared in the streets appealing to the people "not to purchase from the Arabs." Here is the text of one of them.

To the Pillory!

"Even during these bloody days Jewish women from Tel Aviv have dared to purchase alien agricultural products on the Karmel market (Arab market in the city--D. P.).

"Shame on those who purchase on the Karmel market and in the adjacent lanes!" (Then follows a "list of traders" with addresses--in case anyone wants to break their windows.--D. P.)

"The Jewish woman is also a mother: the Karmel market undermines our existence today and in the future! Do not buy on the Karmel market! Damn the destroyers of the Jewish economy!"¹⁷

The pamphlet was published in 1929--even before the time when in Europe, in Germany, there began to appear posters with the appeal: "Aryans, do not purchase from the Jews!"

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted from an ZO GADEREKH, 26 March 1980. (Here and subsequently the titles of publications in Hebrew are given in Russian transliteration.)

2. For a more detailed criticism of this myth see Shlomo Frenkl, Amakhlintanim, p. 3--AOLAM AZE, 1979, No 2198, p 52.
3. "Atnua atsionit, veakamat medinat Israel," Jerusalem, 1975, Kh. A.
4. Eliyakhū Eliyashar, "Likhyot im palestininim," Jerusalem, 1975, p 4.
5. M. Louvish, Aliyah (1880-1930), "Immigration and Settlement," Jerusalem, Keter Publishing House, 1973, p 61.
6. "Atlas karta letoldot erets Israel mereshit aityashvut vead kom amedina, Jerusalem, 1972.
7. "Kitvey Herzl. Bisney am veolam," Kh. B. Neum Bekongress-Uganda, 1903, Khotsaat Asfarim Atsionit, Makhadurat, Maariv, 1971, p 104.
8. E. Eliyashar, "Likhyot im palestininim," p 49.
9. "Kitvey Herzl. Bisney am veolam," Kh. A., p 153, Kh. B., p 154.
10. "Atnua atsionit, veakamat medinat Israel," Kh. B., pp 222-230.
11. Ibid., p 231, and also J. Weitz, "Land Ownership," "Immigration and Settlement," p 106.
12. J. Tsur, "The Jewish National Fund," "Immigration and Settlement," p 112.
13. "Kovets ashomer. Teudot, zikhronot, vedivrey-khaarakha ktuvim bidey vatikey ashomer," "Khotsaat arkhion aavoda," TARTsAKh, p 320.
14. "Atnua atsionit, veakamat medinat Israel," Kh. B., p 231.
15. "Pirkey apoel atsair," Khotsaat Tverski, TARTsU, p 341.
16. Moshe Smilyansky, Lisheelat Aamelim, "Aolam," TAR'AD, No 14.
17. "Atnua atsionit, veakamat medinat Israel," Kh. B., p 277.

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CSO: 1807/473

THIRD WORLD ISSUES

BOOK ON FORMATION OF AFRICAN PEASANT COOPERATIVES REVIEWED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 62-63

[Review by D. Karakhanyan, candidate of economic sciences, of the book by Ye. N. Vasilyeva, "Koooperirovaniye krestyanstva v afrikanskikh stranakh sotsialisticheskoy orientatsii. Politiko-pravovyye aspekty" [Cooperation of the Peasantry in African Countries of a Socialist Orientation. Politico-Legal Aspects], Moscow, main editorial board for Eastern literature of the publishing house "Nauka," 1984, 100 pp]

[Text] The book under review is devoted to a crucial subject--problems of the cooperation of the peasantry in African countries with a socialist orientation. The questions of cooperation have already been investigated in a number of works of Soviet African experts, but far from all of them have clearly delimited the legal aspect of the cooperative movement from the actual economic and social processes.

It is to Ye. N. Vasilyeva's credit that she was the first to approach the problem of cooperation precisely from the legal standpoint, although not all countries of a socialist orientation have created a fully developed legal base for cooperative construction. The book's primary premise is that under the concrete conditions of this group of countries "the law acts not only as a regulator of the cooperative process, but also as a stimulator of its development, since the development of norms for cooperative law, in the majority of cases, precedes extensive practical spreading of cooperation" (p 4).

From the economic standpoint during the course of cooperation large farms are created, which make it possible to increase the labor productivity of the peasants and increase the output of agricultural products as well as to replace physical production with commercial production. In the political aspect the development of cooperation contributes to the creation of a more stable social base for the ruling bloc of progressive forces. As a result of the appearance of the cooperative peasantry and the establishment of its alliance with the young proletariat there is a more extensive enlistment of the peasants in the management of the state within the framework of this alliance.

In a number of countries the social orientation of the cooperatives is still inadequate, but measures are being taken everywhere for further increasing their numbers, the author notes. It is typical of this investigation to use a comprehensive approach to analyzing the cooperation of the peasantry in such countries as Algeria, Ethiopia and Tanzania, and it elucidates the illegal aspects of management of this process. Thus, for example, in Ethiopia, according to the directives of the PMAC of 1979, there is to be a gradual transformation of cooperatives of Stage I ("Malba") into cooperatives of Stage II ("Volba"). The highest form of cooperation are cooperatives of Stage III ("Volano"). In the opinion of Ethiopian leaders, cooperatives of Stage II are already a fairly developed kind of production cooperation which is based on the utilization of socialist principles. But since the country has set the task of consolidating cooperatives and improving their material and technical base, the "Volba" should enter the higher stage--"Volano." This is characterized by a higher level of technical support, which will make it possible to change over to specialization in the sphere of agricultural production and the formation of agroindustrial complexes (p 79). Thus at the beginning of 1984 there were 1,008 production cooperatives in operation in the country, whose members included 60,000 peasants.

The author discussed not only the successes of cooperation, but also the failures in cooperative construction in certain countries (Guinea).

The book would undoubtedly have gained something if in its legal aspect cooperation in states with a socialist orientation had been juxtaposed to this same process in countries of capitalist development. It is also a pity that the work did not take into account the latest figures concerning the "Udzhamaa" movement in Tanzania and the changes that are taking place in agriculture in Algeria.

The investigation conducted by Ye. N. Vasilyeva familiarizes the reader with cooperative legislation of socialistically oriented countries.

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THIRD WORLD ISSUES

BOOK ON KURDS' SOCIOECONOMIC LIFE, TRIBAL RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 63-64

[Review by N. Khalfin, doctor of historical sciences, of the book "Kurdy" [Kurds] by A. M. Menteshashvili, main editorial board of Eastern literature of the publishing house "Nauka," 1984, 238 pp]

[Text] The character and the direction of A. M. Menteshashvili's monograph are determined by its subtitle: "Essays on Socioeconomic Relations, Culture and Daily Life." It is based on numerous materials and literature in Russian, English, French, German, Arabic, Turkish and other languages. Among the sources to which the author turns are Eastern manuscripts, statistical data, announcements in the periodical press, scientific works and so forth. The diversity of the materials that were used enabled the researcher to comprehensively elucidate the life of the Kurdish communities in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and, in a number of cases, even Syria.

The monograph is divided into three parts: "Economy, Daily Life and Culture," "Kurdish Tribes and Tribal Federations" and "Agrarian Relations and Economic Development." The first of these considers the overall condition of the agricultural regions and cities of Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish Kurdistan and the level of development of cattle breeding, farming, trade and small industries there.

The author also touches upon the specific features of the familial relations and the peculiarities of the religious beliefs of the Kurds, and he investigates examples from the rich Kurdish folklore. He considers both intratribal economic relations and economic ties of related land and cattle owners with other tribes. The book characterizes the tribal structure of the Kurds in fairly great detail. The scholar analyzes the base on which the power of the tribal leaders is founded, discloses the peculiarities of their interrelations with the central administration, and shows the growth of the political self-awareness of the Kurds.

The book under review traces the peculiarities of the development of the Kurds' agrarian relations from the Middle Ages to the present day and reveals the various kinds and forms of rent. A. M. Menteshashvili correctly points out the indeterminacy and incompleteness of agrarian transformations in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran and Turkey and the strict dependency of local

peasants on the landowners, although in Syria, as he writes "agrarian transformations of recent years have severely undermined large property ownership and the semifeudal production relations, including in regions populated by Kurds. The political power of the large landowners has been basically undermined, although the economic positions of the landowners are still fairly strong" (p 170).

A relatively small section but one that is full of content has been devoted to the urbanization of Kurdistan.

A. M. Menteshashvili's work is filled with geographical, historical, political, socioeconomic, statistical and ethnographic information, and it includes genealogical tables of Kurdish emirs, Dzhaf and Khauroman Bekzade (rulers) and an extensive bibliography and index of ethnic names.

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GENERAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SOVIET AUTOMOBILE EXPORT FIGURES. "How many motor vehicles does our country export, in particular passenger cars, and to what countries?" automobile fan I. Filatov, from Chirkent, asks. In order to get the reply we referred to the most recently published annual statistical reference aid, "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR v 1984 g." [USSR Foreign Trade in 1984]. That aid gives the following figures. In the total export of commodities from the USSR, passenger cars, motorcycles, and motor scooters constitute, in terms of value, one percent, and that of trucks and garage equipment, 1.4 percent. The export of passenger cars in 1984 came to 243,623 vehicles (in 1983, 239,901). The ten top countries to purchase Soviet passenger cars during that year were: Hungary, 26,899; France, 23,340; Bulgaria, 20,901; Yugoslavia, 20,892; East Germany, 17,120; Belgium, 17,078; Finland, 13,492; Czechoslovakia, 11,964; England, 11,054; and Egypt, 9642. It must be noted that approximately 52 percent of the total export goes to the socialist countries. As for the export of trucks and motor buses, that is measured not in individual vehicles, but in the total value of the vehicles sold. The ten top countries to purchase Soviet trucks in 1984 were: Angola, Cuba, Afghanistan, People's Republic of China, Bulgaria, Vietnam, Hungary, Egypt, Syria, and East Germany. Among the importers of our motor buses, Cuba is in first place, followed by Afghanistan, Hungary, Vietnam, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Syria, and Cambodia. [Text] [Moscow ZA RULEM in Russian 10 Oct 85 p 14] [COPYRIGHT: "Za rulem", 1985] 5075

CSO: 1825/21

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

POZNER INTERVIEWED ON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S., USSR IN MEDIA

[Editorial Report] Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 December 1985 carries on page 3 a 2,400-word Yu. Kudimov interview--date and place not given--with Vladimir Pozner, commentator for the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting's Central Radio Broadcasting to Foreign Countries. The interview is entitled "Source of Distrust, or How the U.S. Propaganda Media Depict the USSR" and is carried under the rubric "Conversation With a Competent Person." Pozner cites instances to show the "stereotyped" picture of the USSR presented in the United States and criticizes stations such as the Voice of America for attempting to distort the image of the USSR while embellishing that of the west. Pozner accepts that the U.S. standard of living is high but also emphasizes the contrasts to be found there between rich and poor and employed and unemployed. Pozner accepts that the Soviet coverage of life in capitalist countries is "sometimes guilty of superficiality." Pozner ends by stressing the importance of contacts between the U.S. and Soviet peoples, particularly on the personal level, as a way of correcting misconceptions about each other.

CSO: 1807/155

WESTERN EUROPE

CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION, ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT IN DENMARK VIEWED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by I. Melnikov and A. Platoshkin, Copenhagen-Moscow: "The Large in the Small: PRAVDA Special Correspondents Tell About Denmark"]

[Text] Copenhagen's air portal is not distinguished by architectural lavishness: glass, concrete, conveyors and electronics. At the border control counter a pretty girl asked with concern even before looking at our passports: "You haven't come to find work, have you?..."

We were reminded of this first anxious question more than a few times on our travels through the nation.

Hundreds of two-way routes now link the Soviet Union and Denmark. Engineers, agricultural experts and scientists exchange know-how, representatives of trade union and youth organizations, members of parliament and "stars" in the arts and sports communicate. But there are no stronger ties, we believe, than those which unite the communists of the two nations.

We were guests at a celebration of the newspaper LAND OG FOLK, visited primary organizations, learned about the work performed by activists of the CPD [Communist Party of Denmark] in the trade unions and talked with party leaders, with its veterans and its youth. These meetings are what we will be discussing.

If asked to name the main feature of the Danish communists, we would answer without hesitation: integrity and principle.

This is manifested in the activities of the party, relatively small but mobile and purposeful. It takes a sober and realistic approach to problems of domestic and international life. It is not lacking in devotion to the cause of the working class in its nation or loyalty to internationalism. And these features are reflected as though in a drop of water in the conduct and actions of the CPD members, whether it be a worker or a municipal employee, a trade union figure or an engineer, a student or a pensioner.

...A party meeting was underway in Vidovre, a suburb of Copenhagen. The agenda was very broad. It covered elections to local agencies of government,

the situation in Iran, the influx of foreigners into the nation.... The army of the unemployed is growing in Denmark. And the arrival of immigrants, also aspiring to jobs at the machine tools and at construction sites, at hospitals and in transportation is evoking displeasure in a part of the population. The meeting in Vidovre was another demonstration of the class solidarity of the communists. They pointed out that the employment is caused not by immigration but by the existing social system.

While fighting for a better life for the workers, the Danish communists are not constricting it. We met Jan Andersen, member of the Executive Committee of the CPD Central Committee, in the office of the chairman of one of the leading divisions of the trade union of metal-workers. Jan himself is in charge of the office.

"The vital interests of the workers cannot be protected," he said with conviction, "without a struggle, without constant pressure on the government, on the entrepreneurs, on the bourgeois society as a whole."

All of this was reflected also in the main slogans for the celebration of the newspaper LAND OG FOLK. One of them, "Unity Against the Rightists," brought back vivid memories of the class conflict which developed last spring. A general strike brought out the fighting spirit of the working class and confirmed the vital need to unite its ranks in the struggle against monopolistic capital.

Not just communists, but representatives of almost 200 of the nation's political and social organizations and movements, including those of trade unions, the women and the youth, converged from all parts of the nation in the capital's Felledparken for the newspaper's festivities. On one of the park lanes we were introduced to a forklift operator who was completing the job of setting up a pavilion. He was a member of the Social Democratic Party. This would seem paradoxical: A person working voluntarily and without recompense for a celebration for "someone else."

"Why someone else?" he asked, taking offense. "This is our, the workers' celebration, and therefore a common affair."

A solitary male figure wandered about at the corner of Olenshleger-gade, which is covered with closely constructed houses (the area has from time immemorial been a poor, workers' neighborhood). When we passed by, the young man glanced over us with dull and indifferent eyes.

"There is hardly a day he is not here," Bro Ptersen, a young worker for a local newspaper, VESTERBRO BLADET, said, anticipating our question. "If he could get work after school, he would not be hanging around here with nothing to do and would not be sliding into drug addiction."

There are many brilliant pages in the long history of this Vesterbro area of Copenhagen. It became famous as a center of resistance during the Hitlerite occupation. Today Vesterbro is more affected by unemployment than the other areas. Its victims are primarily the youth. Dispairing, many young men and women find out about drugs or even set out on a path of crime.

"Just about everybody is talking about unemployment," our companion smiled sadly and said. "In Parliament, in the newspapers and on the television screen. This is like--How can I put it?--complaining about bad weather. You can curse it, but you can't replace it with good weather...."

Yes, there was good reason for that anxious question from the employee at the airport. As of July of this year there were 300,000 unemployed in Denmark, and the number is constantly growing. That is a large number for a nation with a population of 5 million.

The communists have always taken the struggle against unemployment as their vital cause. And they will permit no one to evade that task. This is why the communist party attaches such importance to its participation in the activities of the trade unions. There must be protection against retribution from the bourgeois state, against a lockout by the entrepreneurs. Otherwise.... Danish trade unions were fined 20 million kroner this year for strikes conducted in the spring. This money vanished into the so-called "dispute fund" of the entrepreneurs.

The shady streets of Copenhagen took us to a suburban highway and from there to Glostrup, to a small, trim building. It houses the teachers' trade union, one of four in the nation. The trade unions take part in internal life and strive to improve the working conditions of teachers and to increase the funds available for maintaining the schools.

"We also have a specific perception of matters of foreign policy," said Laila Larsen, one of the union activists. "For us it is primarily a matter of securing peace and eliminating the mad competition in amassing mountains of weapons...."

Laila was a person of few words, and there was no need for long-winded speeches. Staring down at us from the wall was the slogan: "One can play on earth, but one does not play with the Earth."

It is the duty of teachers to teach good. And good is first of all peace, we were told by the union activists. Teachers and school children of Glostrup went to one of the antiwar demonstrations carrying balloons with the inscription "Peace."

Yes, many of the Danish people do not regard the subject of peace in an abstract manner. Sober-minded people see cooperation with the Soviet Union and progressive forces of other nations as the path to peace. Numerous meetings and talks convinced us of this. Together with Isha Greta Henriksen, chairman of the renters' union in the town, and her friends, we visited the families of common workers. In one of the apartments we saw a humorous inscription: "Before inviting a Russian to your home, visit his home."

"Well, did you?" we asked the housewife.

"Yes, we did. Russians are cheerful, friendly and hospitable people. They too are for peace. So we can and must stick together."

The peace movement in Denmark has assumed broad scope. Surveys show that at least 70 percent of the nation's inhabitants are against the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Europe. And how this infuriates the Pentagon hawks! U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle literally screamed at a press conference in Copenhagen because of Denmark's refusal to contribute to the program for deploying American medium-range missiles in a number of West European nations: "We put tax evaders like this in prison in the USA"!

Perhaps Perle scared some people, but the threats had no effect on participants in the antiwar movement. The Danish press reported that the fighters for peace recently penetrated into the grounds of a NATO radio station in the town of Tonner and hung up a banner which said: "Attention, preparations for war are also being conducted here"!

The CPD's work in the mass antiwar movement is multifaceted. The communists have come out with the slogan "Agreement now!". This appeal for an agreement on a non-nuclear zone in Northern Europe has gained popularity in the nation and become well-known in other states of Northern Europe. The communists actively oppose those who attempt to drive the fighters for peace into anti-Soviet positions.

"The antiwar movement has become an influential political force in Denmark today," we were told by Jorgen Jensen, chairman of the CPD. "The Folketing cannot ignore us and has recently adopted a number of important decisions. These decisions require the government to oppose the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the sinister Star Wars plans, and to promote realization of the concept of establishing a non-nuclear zone in Northern Europe. We communists feel that our nation can and must make a contribution to this important cause.

"The minds and hearts of people respond and will continue to respond to the Soviet Union's peace-loving foreign policy. Specific initiatives by the USSR, including the moratorium on all nuclear tests, has been extensively acknowledged here in Denmark. All of this is giving new impetus to the movement of the fighters for peace...."

We left Copenhagen at noon on a bright, sunny day. The aircraft rapidly gained altitude. Instead of multicolored, tiled roofs, small, semitransparent masses of clouds now spiralled beneath the wings. They seemed like balloons, like envoys of peace and friendship from the children of Denmark to all the children, to all the people on the planet.

11499

CSO: 1807/090

WESTERN EUROPE

USSR-FRANCE: ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by A. Agafonov, Paris and Moscow, under rubric "USSR-France": "In the Interests of Both Countries: International Notes"]

[Text] On the streets of Paris one can see many signs of the fruitful cooperation between our countries. They include the numerous taxis in the city with the Lada trade mark, the Kosmos movie theater on Rue Rennes, which specializes in the showing of Soviet motion pictures, and the Aeroflot office on the Champs Elysees, the services of which are used by many Frenchmen making tourist or business trips to the USSR.

In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Victory over fascist Germany and the creation of the United Nations, and the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Accords, many people in France are especially aware of the fact that it was precisely the cooperation with the USSR that contributed in the 1960's to the reinforcement of the country's authority on the international arena and to the intensification of its positions in the world, because it was precisely the Soviet Union and France that were present at the very beginning of the policy of detente, and it was precisely our two countries that made the most significant contribution to the preparation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. And today also the relations between our countries largely determine the security in Europe, as well as the fate of the world as a whole.

The varied cooperation between France and the Soviet Union has always been profitable for the peoples of our countries and has had a favorable influence upon the international situation. An important role in this regard was played by the permanent political consultations that contributed to a situation in which the Soviet-French ties in the area of economics, science, technology, and culture are on an extremely high level. In our bilateral relations a special place has always been occupied by the summit meetings between the Soviet and French leaders, which contributed to the further development of mutually advantageous relations. For example, the recent visit to the USSR by President F. Mitterand in June 1984 gave an impetus to the expansion of contacts in various areas, and provided the opportunity for discussing the prospects of expanding the cooperation and mutual understanding.

In the question of trade and economic ties, the position of the Soviet Union is determined by the interests of both countries and is not subject to any fluctuations in the international situation. During the recent session of the permanent combined Soviet-French commission on scientific-technical and economic cooperation (the "Large Commission"), the paths were set down for the

further expansion of ties in these areas; and important questions that had arisen in the area of trade relations were resolved. A number of major agreements were concluded after the commission session, including a contract for the construction of the second phase of the Astrakhan Gas-Industry Complex, which was concluded with the French (Teknip) company, and a protocol governing the shipments to the USSR of the output of ferrous metallurgy by the Yuzinor nationalized enterprise during the period 1986-1987. For France, the economy of which has been undergoing problems in recent years, the agreements governing cooperation with our country are extremely important, guaranteeing the volume of production and sale of output and the employment rate of the workers.

During the period from 1980 through 1984 the commodity turnover between the USSR and France more than doubled as compared with the previous five-year period. With regard to the volume of trade with the Soviet Union, France is in fourth place among the capitalist countries.

The diverse ties between our countries are not limited to the confines of trade. The participants in those ties include various social organizations, friendship societies, and twinned cities. Tourism is developing actively. Close relations have developed in the field of scientific and cultural cooperation. Especially important ties have developed between Soviet and French scientists and specialists in the field of the peaceful assimilation and research of outer space. French cosmonaut Jean-Louis Chretien took part in a joint Soviet-French flight into space on board the Soyuz T-6, and French specialists participated in preparing and carrying out a research project on Comet Halley within the confines of the Venus--Comet Halley project. On board the Vega-1 automatic interplanetary station, with the cooperation of French scientists, pieces of apparatus and equipment that had been manufactured for that important research project were installed. The participants of the 12th joint Soviet-French conference on cooperation in the research and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, which was held in Paris, greeted with a large amount of interest the reports from specialists of the two countries concerning the preliminary results of the carrying out of that project.

Here is an example from another area. Situated on Rue Bussy in the capital is the Globe bookstore that is familiar to many Parisians, and that specializes in the sale of books published by Soviet publishing houses both in French and in the languages of the peoples of the USSR. Items that are very popular are the editions of works by the classic authors of Russian literature, and modern artistic works. During the past five years alone, through the services of the All-Union Agency for Originator's Certificates [Soviet patents] (VAAP), more than 280 contracts were concluded for the translation of the works of French authors into the languages of the peoples of the USSR and approximately 160 for the translation of the works of Soviet authors into French.

Firm ties also exist between the movie makers of our countries. Recently, on the sets of the Pathe-Cinema movie studio in Paris, there began the filming of a television series entitled "Workers of the World," based on the novel of the same name by Victor Hugo. It will be shown by Soviet television and the French Antenne-2 television company. The first stage of the joint project has already been completed.

Bonds of friendship and solidarity have linked Soviet and French Communists for a long time. The French Communist Party [FCP] has been making a valuable contribution to the reinforcement of friendship between our nations. On 2 September there was a meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and General Secretary of the FCP G. Marche. In a joint statement by the CPSU and the FCP that was issued on the basis of the results of that meeting, it is emphasized that the ties between the parties "contribute to the development of cooperation in the interests of the Soviet and French peoples and of both countries, in the struggle for peace, democracy, freedom, and socialism."

An important event in the relations between the two countries will be the visit to France by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev. That visit has been called upon to deepen the mutual understanding between our countries and to promote the cause of resurrecting the detente and of normalizing the international situation as a whole.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

STROESSNER REGIME ASSAILED

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Suglovov under rubric "A Commentator's Opinion": "The Stressner Farce"]

[Text] A nationwide municipal election has been held in Paraguay in an atmosphere of protests by organizations that are in opposition to the fascist regime. The result of this impudent political farce could have been foreseen long before it was carried out. Dictator Alfredo Stroessner and his own Colorado Party, for who knows which time during the past 30 years, hurriedly declared itself to be the winners in the election and thus snatched away from the nation, under the muzzles of submachine guns, the mandate for managing the country until 1993.

The election that was held, however, clearly demonstrated that the only support for the dictator now is the military upper class, the representatives of which possess all the wealth in the country, as well as the police, which has been trained by the Nazi criminals who have been hiding in Paraguay to use cruel methods of reprisal against the opposition. During the years of the Stroessner rule, every fourth Paraguayan has spent time in prison, and tens of thousands of political prisoners have been cruelly murdered. More than 1.5 million persons have fled this "Fourth Reich" in the attempt to save their lives.

The country's economy is undergoing a serious crisis. Every second able-bodied person in Paraguay is out of work. The country's foreign debt has reached \$12 billion. Paraguay has been farmed out to foreign monopolies which control one-third of the agricultural production and animal husbandry. As they accumulate profits in the billions, they openly plunder the country's natural resources and devastate its economy. The "elite" of society -- more than 30,000 Hitlerite hangmen, who are being sought by judicial agencies of many countries -- acts openly as the accomplice of the imperialistic plunderers.

Nevertheless, as the recent election has shown, the nation of Paraguay has not been broken. Despite the fierce reprisals perpetrated by the reactionary forces, there has been a strengthening of the resistance toward the fascist regime. An active part in that movement is being taken by the workers, the peasants, and the representatives of the intellectual class and the student class. The overthrow of the hated regime and the carrying out of democratic reforms -- those are currently the chief goals of the antidictatorial struggle that is raging in Paraguay.

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DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN NICARAGUA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 85 pp 7-19

[Article by Yu. G. Onufriyev: "Nicaragua: Peculiarities of Revolutionary Transformations in the Economy"]

[Text] The victory of the national anti-imperialist revolution and the assumption of power by the national renewal government created decisive conditions for overcoming Nicaragua's economic backwardness. The main problem of many Latin American countries--finding the optimal path to eliminating their dependency on the centers of world capitalism--was again at the center of the attention of the regional community. The interest in this is brought about not only by the fact that the country was forced to restore its economy after the lengthy rule of the dictatorial Somoza clan, but also by the fact that the Sandinistas are trying to find new ways of establishing a common destiny for the Nicaraguan nation with the leading social-progressive tendencies in world development.

The Concept of a Transition Period

After the victory of the revolution the national renewal government took the course which corresponded most fully to the interests of the broad masses of people. An important role here will be allotted to unifying national forces and strengthening the economic and political foundations of the new Nicaragua. In keeping with this the process of economic restructuring is being carried out on the basis of a "mixed economy,"¹ within whose framework the state, cooperative and private sectors coexist. "Even guided by socialist principles," said a number of the national leadership of the FSLN [Sandinistan National Liberation Front], Agriculture Minister J. Wheelock Roman said, "we cannot transform our society by entering on the path of expropriation of all production capital."² This approach was presented previously in the second "program for economic renewal in the interests of the people" adopted in 1980.

The position of the FSLN is based on the fact that the inherited structure of the economy which for a long period in history involved a dependent, subordinate position for the country in the world economic ties of capitalism can be replaced during a kind of transition period for the country, which presupposes maximum mobilization of all available resources, including social ones.

Take, for instance, the problem of agrarian transformations. Certain foreign researchers simplify it, seeing the possibility of the advancement of agricultural production only in the support of large or medium-sized farms (of the private or state type). Yet they forget that the small peasantry, whose potential was previously utilized only in the interests of the landed oligarchy, could play a serious role in solving problems of national development under the new conditions.

But here one should take into account that transforming the small peasant sector into one of the active forces of the "mixed economy" and including entire groups of people who are accustomed to economic compulsion among the creators of national history is not a simple task. It is complicated by the fact that the Nicaraguan countryside has evolved in such a way that various forms of social structures have not been crowded out by others, but have been superimposed upon them. As a result there has formed a conglomerate within which the boundaries between social groups are extremely relative and mobile, and various occupations can be represented by one individual: a peasant, a worker, a merchant, a driver and so forth. And his social mobility is conditioned not by one but by several types of public production, so that there is a labor force of an interstructural nature.

Such a path of development of the rural labor force was quite suitable to Latifundism: the backward structures held the peasants back while the new ones made it possible to exploit them more intensively.

In either case the peasant felt oppressed. In order to stimulate his interest and attraction to more productive kinds of activity the revolution opened up for him the possibility of independently finding the path to active participation in the renewal of the nation. This bears witness both the complexities of the transformations in the agrarian sector and to the uniqueness of the transition period in Nicaragua, which has been reflected in the programs of the FSLN.

In these a great deal of significance is attached to the following question: to what type does the farm of the medium or large landowner belong, is it intended for personal consumption or for expanded reproduction? The balanced approach to the private sector is determined by the inclusion of certain groups of the local bourgeoisie, including agrarian, in the process of national renewal. The revolutionary authorities guarantee the inviolability of the private sector as long as it does not act against the plans for the country's renewal.³ In his speech on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the death of C. Fonseca, a member of the national leadership of the FSLN, B. Arse, said: "In the struggle for revolutionary transformations we do not exclude those who do not think as we do...and we are implementing this policy of national unity with those who were with us in the fight against the dictatorship and today are accompanying us in this struggle."⁴

The social significance of the measures being conducted by the government in the economic area is shown particularly by the law concerning the agrarian reform. It gives the state freedom of action when making decisions concerning the expropriation of one farm or another in the interests of the revolution.⁵

Based on this the state does not disturb large and medium-sized farms if they are being managed effectively." Thus the FSLN strives to take advantage of the activity of the private sector in the interests of national advancement.

At the present time four forms of property coexist and are developing in Nicaragua: national property, property created on the basis of confiscation of the property of Somoza and his stooges; private property belonging to large and medium local capital in the sphere of industry, agriculture, trade and services; and small property representing the interests of small producers in the cities and rural areas.⁷ And, finally, a cooperative sector has arisen in the country which occupies an especially important position in agriculture. Mixed enterprises with the participation of state and private capital have not developed as a form of property.

In part a similar structure is inherent in other countries of the region as well. But the distinguishing feature is that the state property is a force which determines the activity of the private sector and thus stimulates its activity. Nicaragua's "mixed economy" differs from similar structures in other Latin American countries also in that it is a mechanism for development in the transition period. It does not inherently include those features which are linked to models of a socially static kind.

Table 1--Forms of Property in Various Branches of the Economy
(in % of GNP)⁸

<u>Branches</u>	<u>National Property Sector</u>		<u>Small Production and Cooperatives</u>		<u>Medium and Large Private Property</u>	
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>
Agriculture	14	21	23	25	63	54
Processing industry	25	31	15	15	60	54
Other branches of material production	80	90	15	5	5	5
Trade and services	25	38	50	50	25	12
GNP as a whole	34	39	28	30	38	31

Immediately after coming to power the government reviewed the indebtedness of the private sector and wrote off a large part of the debts. Interest on credit was set at a much lower level than it was on the international financial market. There was also a significant increase in the volume of credit: in 1983 the private sector (including small production) received 54 percent of all the credit issued by state banks (see Table 2).

Table 2--Distribution of Credit Among Branches of the Economy and Forms of Property During 1980-1982 (%)⁹

<u>Branches</u>	<u>National Property Sector</u>	<u>Private Sector</u>	<u>Total</u>
Farming	32	68	100
Animal husbandry	37	63	100
Industry	66	34	100

The economic programs of the FSLN play an important role in effective utilization of the resources allotted by the states and their efficient application by the private sector. The first such program was adopted by the government junta for national reconstruction on 9 July 1979. It set the following goal: to restore the economy and protect it from the influence of negative external factors. In order to fight against the collapse of the program two plans were adopted: the emergency plan (it envisioned supplying the population with food products and so forth) and the plan for restoration of the economy.

The second program was adopted in January 1980. Its theme was protection of the revolutionary conquests, strengthening national unity and changing over to the construction of a new economy. This was a period when the contours of the economic and military threat from the United States began to be seen over the country.

The "Emergency Economic Program for 1981" contained an evaluation of the preceding one and set new tasks and goals for development. In this connection J. Wheelock Roman noted: "Each time we concretize one or another plan we must also develop an emergency plan because along with the threat of aggression which faces us...we are also experiencing the influence of the international market. It is difficult to make plans in a country which depends on external factors. And it is even more difficult if one adds to the economic factors, including the world economic crisis, the political factors and military aggression to which the country is being subjected."¹⁰

In the "Program-83" submitted by the government to the state council in May 1983 priority was given to tasks of defending the country, providing the population with food and increasing the export potential.

During the course of the preelection campaign of 1984 the FSLN proposed a new program which was a creative generalization of the socioeconomic experience accumulated during the revolution and which lays the basis for Nicaragua's further development along the path of national renewal. In the sphere of economics the program envisions granting assistance from the revolution to all productive sectors (peasantry and small producers, the creative intelligentsia) which actively engaged in the struggle to overcome the remnants of backwardness, and are ascribing more and more new content to the possibilities concealed in the Nicaraguan model of the "mixed economy."¹¹

The mobilizing role of the programs and their essence bear witness to the qualitatively different content and tasks of the "mixed economy" and to the growing capability of the country's revolutionary forces to consistently carry out a process of deep socioeconomic transformations.

The "Mixed Economy" Policy in Action

The national priorities for development which are supported by the FSLN, naturally, even in spite of the state's constructive policy with respect to the private sector, periodically cause dissatisfaction on the part of various bourgeois circles, mainly arising from the interests of business undertakings.

For example, part of the middle bourgeoisie has begun to complain that there is no "favorable climate and confidence." On the economic plane its demands have amounted mainly to asking for an unlimited right to dispose of their property and profit, a return of national property to private hands (directly or in the form of shared participation), nonintervention of the state in the area of trade (both domestic and foreign), and so forth. Here individual groups of the bourgeoisie have resorted to direct economic pressure on the government. Thus during 1980-1981 private investments amounted to only 3.4 percent of the GNP as compared to 12.2 percent in 1970-1978.¹² From 1978 through 1982 \$640 million were sent out of the country.¹³

Additionally influential circles of the local bourgeoisie, relying on support from the United States, are trying to present a distorted picture of the economic measures being taken by the government for strengthening the country's defense capabilities.

Thus the problem of interrelations between state and private entrepreneurial initiatives has become the object of increasing political struggle. The deep reason for its aggravation has been the desire of the bourgeoisie to achieve more extensive participation in the making of political and economic decisions. It would like the kind of power which, on the one hand, would be liberal enough and would guarantee unlimited freedom for business activity and, on the other hand, would be conservative enough to prevent including new social forces in the process of management of the society. These attitudes have been promoted to no small degree by the financial support from the United States which under the Carter government granted credit to Nicaragua in the amount of \$75 million (under the condition that it would be used mainly in the private sector).¹⁴

Evaluating the actions of the national bourgeoisie Nicaraguan Vice President Sergio Ramirez noted: "They are speaking about trying to force us to move to the defensive, to complicate Nicaragua's international position and to limit our political space within the country so as to force the vanguard to make radical concessions as a condition for continuing cooperation."¹⁵ "But," he goes on to clarify, "the bourgeoisie were wrong...in counting on obtaining political power under the condition of their participation in the revolutionary plan, and they continue to be mistaken since their role in this plan amounts to participation in production; this is precisely the sphere of their social participation."¹⁶

In order to realize this strategy the revolutionary government has made adjustments in the policy directed toward strengthening national unity; first and foremost it changed the attitude toward the private sector as a "unified whole" since clearly counterrevolutionary groups of the bourgeoisie have been observed in it.¹⁷ This pertained mainly to some of the large entrepreneurs who joined together into the COSEP [Higher Council of Private Enterprise].

At the same time the government entered on a course toward strengthening cooperation with the patriotic segments of the private sector. The greatest state support began to be given to the middle-sized and small enterprises, cooperatives and handicraft shops. Let us note that they are the ones that provide employment for more than half of the economically active population.¹⁸

Government measures set as their goal, in the words of the magazine ENVIO, "legally to strengthen and streamline the alliance with the new enterprise sector."¹⁹

Defining its policy with respect to the private sector (including large-scale enterprises) under the conditions when a number of entrepreneurs have advanced the slogan "to produce or not to produce," the government published a law according to which a private enterprise whose owner had sabotaged production activity was subject to expropriation. Moreover it stimulated the activization of the economic work of private enterprises and, having devoted special attention to the problem of their profitability, began to allot large amounts of currency for production purposes.

With such a policy it is possible under difficult conditions to achieve positive strides in relations with the private sector and, in the final analysis, an increase in production. This, naturally, does not mean that the "bourgeoisie has begun to cooperate actively with the revolutionary government, but it is not going against the national plan. It is working and producing, and this is precisely what interests the nation."²⁰

Strides in the Economy

Of course the position of the bourgeoisie creates certain difficulties for revolutionary powers in solving the most important problems, including accelerating the growth of production in order to satisfy the basic demands of the population. Clarifying the specific nature of the current moment, the director of the Institute of Economic and Social Research, J. Gorostiaga wrote: "How does one make sure that a mixed economy, which is in private hands to a considerable degree, corresponds more to the interests of the people and not to the interests of capital?"²¹ And further: "When a private enterprise expresses dissatisfaction with the lack of a 'suitable climate,' it bases this on the amount of profit from the invested capital. And the people, in turn, will complain about the fact that the private sector is not satisfying their basic needs.... The resolution of this contradiction is a serious dilemma for the revolution...."²²

In light of this one is especially impressed by those positive strides in many areas of socioeconomic construction which Nicaragua managed to achieve during the years after the victory of the revolution. This is both a result of the immense efforts made by the government in order to carry out the national economic tasks that were set and evidence of the success of realizing the new approach to the concept of "economic pluralism" ("mixed economy") and the desire not to allow an open confrontation with the private sector and to find a possibility of continuing cooperation with it.

Take, for example, agriculture. In order not to "undermine" the principle of the "mixed economy," in the first stage the government began to encourage the renting of land by the peasants. According to the law, the rental rates were set at a level lower than 89 percent of the previous one. The peasants were granted the right to demand the release of any uncultivated land for rent at these rates. At the same time the government provided 97,000 peasants with credit from the National Bank for Development for Production Purposes. Let us

note that before the revolution only 16,000 of the 110,000 peasant farms had bank credit. The rest were forced to resort to the services of commercial moneylenders (paying them up to 50 percent annually) and who sometimes gathered the entire harvest on the route. The state also established procurement prices for agricultural products that were advantageous for the peasants, and rendered them assistance in sales. In 1984 there was a marked acceleration of the rates of the agrarian reform. While in 1982 an average of 647 peasant families were allotted land each month, in 1983 this figure was 1,147, and in the first 5 months of 1984--1,628.²³ In 1984, in keeping with the agrarian reform, it was intended to turn 300,000 farmsteads over to peasant production cooperatives and 200,000--for individual ownership. During the period of 1981-1984 a total of 30,900 peasant families received land (27 percent of all the peasant families or 41 percent of those needing land).²⁴ Various forms of cooperation began to be developed in the peasant environment.

The policy of stimulating small and medium peasant farming and the balanced approach to large producers served as a basis for the growth of agricultural production. Thus during the period of 1979-1983 the average annual rate of increase in the output from farming amounted to 12.5 percent (but taking into account the animal husbandry branch which sustained serious harm during the years of the civil war--8 percent).

It should also be noted that relatively high growth rates were observed in the spheres of trade, transportation and services. Even during the first years of the revolution the government managed to essentially curb inflation: from 80 percent in 1989 it dropped to 35 percent in 1980 and to 24 percent in 1981.

As for the GNP as a whole, in 1983 it increased as compared to the preceding year by 5.3 percent (in the same prices) and the increase in the industrial output amounted to 13 percent.

This development of events could not but gratify the friends of the new Nicaragua. But this did not suit imperialism in the United States or those who were backing it. In order to stifle and destabilize the revolutionary regime, the Reagan administration introduced an economic blockade and is financing and directing the subversive activities of the "contras" who have become entrenched on the territory of the neighboring states. In 1983 alone the overall economic harm caused by the actions of bands of counterrevolutionaries amounted to about \$350 million.²⁵ Under the conditions of the growing military danger from the United States the revolutionary government was forced to take measures to strengthen the country's defense capabilities. In the middle of 1983 a law was adopted concerning compulsory military service and budget allocations for military purposes more than tripled. For these purposes the country was divided into six autonomous regions and three special zones. This measure contributed not only to increasing the defense capability but also to developing local economic initiative.

Although at the present time the country's economy cannot yet satisfy all the needs of the workers, nonetheless the government is doing a great deal in this area, which agrees to strengthening the authority of the revolutionary power among the masses. In particular, in the interests of the workers the state is

subsidizing the production of many food products. For example, a liter of milk costs a Nicaraguan one-20th of what it costs a resident of the neighboring Costa Rica. And if domestic production does not yet satisfy the demand for certain food products, including those such, for example, as poultry meat and eggs, although the production of these has almost tripled during the years of the revolution) this is explained primarily by the sharply growing consumer capability of the population and the more than doubling of the overall number of consumers of these commercial products.²⁶

The state also subsidizes the development of the sphere of services (transportation, electricity and so forth). Large-scale housing construction is going on in the country, mainly in rural areas, and a public health system is being created. Tens of thousands of boys and girls have already been given the opportunity to go to school and to raise their educational level. In a word, the socioeconomic transformations carried out within the framework of the dialogue of the "mixed economy" are an important indicator of its effectiveness and, the main thing, of the confidence of the masses in the correctness of the course that has been selected for the country's renewal.

In this connection the country's president, D. Ortega, emphasized that the participation of various social segments and economic, political and religious forces of the nation in the process of democratization which is based on the principles of political pluralism and a mixed economy is making a decisive contribution to Nicaragua's renewal.²⁷

The Experience of the First Years

The experience in applying the policy of the revolutionary government with respect to the private sector, which has been accumulated during the 6 years that have passed since the victory of the revolution, is drawing more and more attention.

Certain ultra-left wing groups consider cooperation with the private sector to be little more than betrayal of national interests, the danger of the "restoration of capitalism" in the country and so forth. Such superficial conclusions are reached as a result of complete ignorance of the specific conditions in which the Nicaraguan revolution began and developed, and, the main thing, a lack of understanding of the path to the resolution of the basic contradiction that faces the country.

One should say again that a mixed economy is not an invention of the Nicaraguan revolution. But its functions, like the tendencies in the development of interrelations between the state and private sectors, do not all have the same socioeconomic content. And the question consists not only in the positions held by the state and private capital, but mainly in the path taken by one country or another. For example, in Mexico, Venezuela and a number of other Latin American countries which have chosen the capitalist path of development the role of the state sector, regardless of how strong its positions in the economy may be, amounts in the final analysis to the creation of favorable conditions for private enterprise activity and the very schema of the "mixed economy," reinforced by the doctrine of "political pluralism," in

fact means a policy of "class reconciliation" and subordination of national interests to the interests of the bourgeoisie.

As for Nicaragua, the national Sandinista revolution also "grants the bourgeoisie the opportunity to participate in the process of the country's reconstruction within the framework of the concept of a mixed economy and political pluralism."²⁸ But, as S. Ramirez said at the second congress of the Nicaraguan Association of Sociologists in 1982: "The revolution continues to support the plan for a mixed economy, by which we mean not a juxtaposition of two economic models whereby one could reproduce the capitalism of the past without limitation as though the revolution had allotted special territory for the activity of this archaic system of exploitation. The mixed economy should be arranged on the basis of a harmonious combination of private initiative with the concentration of the higher command in the hands of the public sector, which should jointly bear political responsibility for the development of the entire national economic system along the path of structural transformations, production and distribution of wealth, in other words, along the path of the Sandinista model of social restructuring."²⁹ In other words the idea of political pluralism and a mixed economy presupposes revolutionary hegemony and not division, concession or undermining of this hegemony.

The question arises: But can (or is ready) the bourgeoisie themselves be satisfied with the role of a "productive force" in the structure of the new society which is being created in Nicaragua. In the opinion of J. Wheelock, in such a country as Nicaragua where capitalism has not been significantly developed and the bourgeoisie has not been fully formed as a class, this is possible.³⁰

At the second congress of the Nicaraguan Association of Sociologists S. Ramirez pointed out the historical roots of the backwardness of the local bourgeoisie: "This was a weak agro-exporting bourgeoisie whose capabilities as a social class of taking over the nation were sharply nipped in the bud during the years of North American intervention which from 1912 through 1933 not only alienated them from such important and promising branches of the economy as agriculture and mining, but also stifled or deafened the sense of national worth in this spiritually impoverished and undereducated class, and led to their loss at that time of the historic possibility of being formed as a national bourgeoisie."³¹

This of course does not mean that the bourgeoisie reconciled themselves to this situation. The specific nature of the current moment in Nicaragua includes the fact that although some of the bourgeoisie have not entered on the path of open confrontation with the revolutionary authorities, still they are not striving for active cooperation with them. Faced with a choice--either to continue to participate in production activity and the fulfillment of the government's economic plans or to enter on the path of economic sabotage and to lose everything--it is trying to stay somewhere in the middle. Participating in the restoration of enterprises with the help of the state, the bourgeoisie at the same time is not striving to expand or create new ones, but to shift the concern for the creation of modern production forces to the shoulders of the state. Suffice it to say that the state has made more than 90 percent of the capital investments in the country in recent years.

This creates certain financial and economic difficulties for the popular authorities. But as of today the main contradiction is still not between the revolutionary authorities and the local bourgeoisie, but between imperialism and the progressive forces of the nation. As early as November 1980 at a meeting devoted to the support of the national leadership and the government junta for national reconstruction and the economic council, J. Wheelock said: "Our nation, guided by its vanguard, has risen to struggle not only to overthrow tyranny; the heroic Nicaraguan people have taken up arms also in order to resolve the problem of the most critical social crisis, terrible poverty and stagnation in the economy."³² But, as he goes on to note, if one looks more deeply, the major problem for the country today lies "not in the economy and not in agrarian reform; it is the question of existence itself. This means that the Nicaraguan revolution must first and foremost give priority to the problem of the country's defense and all of the internal processes are being conditioned mainly by the tasks of providing for the existence of the revolutionary authority and defense of the nation."³³

Developing this idea J. Wheelock said: "In order to understand not only the agrarian reform but also many other measures and in general any process which can be carried out by the revolution, I should like to draw attention to certain important issues...some people see the guarantee of the changeover to the new society in the deepening of the revolutionary transformations in the area of the economy.... Others link our process to external political factors, taking into account economic, ideological, moral and other aspects...

"An understanding of the importance of the transformations, mainly in the area of economics is justifiable, but not absolute, for the Nicaraguan revolution...is not free of the kinds of factors which have always characterized the country's historical, economic and social development such as geopolitical elements and the international situation; the latter can affect the process of the transition period regardless of internal economic processes. It is necessary to look for a dialectical unity between these two points of view, one of which proceeds mainly from geopolitical factors and the other from narrow economic ones."³⁴

The main enemy of the Nicaraguan revolution is American imperialism. "Proceeding from the existing reality...it is necessary to keep in mind various combinations in the overall socioeconomic activity of the country and to select those which lead...to the construction of a new society, taking into account the more complicated context: the nation's defense, its unity and the strengthening of revolutionary power."³⁵

The understanding of all this also determines the practical activity of the revolutionary government of Nicaragua today. The revolution has "conscientiously chosen its model of development and has sufficient power to carry it out. The old pre-entrepreneurial class is permitted to participate within the framework of this model. But neither the model itself nor the revolution will be impeded in their advancement because of the fact that the participation of the bourgeoisie is not active or is incomplete or minimal, for we are speaking about a historic process which is moving forward aggressively...."

Regarding the prospects for the development of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, the magazine CUADERNOS POLITICOS wrote: "The rapid increase in the organization of the masses, the strengthening of the state sector and the static nature of the private sector seem to indicate that the society will develop further with the model of the mixed economy as was the case under populist and social democratic variants."³⁶

The new socioeconomic forms that arise during the process of revolutionary transformations show the truly democratic nature of the transformations that are being carried out in the country. And although it is clear that many of them will change even more and new ones will appear--and this is natural, for we are continuing to search for optimal variants of national development which come as close as possible to the specific requirements of the rapidly changing circumstances--on the basis of the general tendencies one can see clearly the main line of the economic process itself and the long-term perspectives.

The path to national renewal for Nicaragua, which under difficult conditions is providing a completely new example of independent development, the high level of revolutionary patriotic awareness of the masses led by the FSLN, their resolve not to give in to the threats and imperial dictatorship of the United States, and their readiness to refute the "plantation" logic of the masters in the White House exert an immense ideological and political influence on the advancement of the liberation movement in the region.

FOOTNOTES

1. The concept of a "mixed economy," as we know was first advanced in the economic program of the government junta for national reconstruction which is known by the name "San Jose Program" which was published on 9 July 1978, that is, not long before the victory of the Sandinista popular revolution.
2. PENSAMIENTO PROPRIO, Managua, 1983, p 11.
3. J. Wheelock Roman, "El Gran Desafio," Managua, 1983, pp 31-42; "Reactivacion, Eficiencia, Austeridad: Ejes del Plan 81," Managua, 1981, pp 25-26.
4. "Segunda Unidad de Estudio Para los C.B.S.," Managua, 1980, p 8.
5. ENCUENTROS, Managua, 1982, No 1, pp 3-11.
6. UNIDAD, Managua, 1984, No 10, p 3.
7. PENSAMIENTO PROPRIO, 1984, No 15, p 7.
8. PENSAMIENTO PROPRIO, 1983, No 6/7, p 25; 1984, No 15, p 20.
9. PENSAMIENTO PROPRIO, 1983, No 6/7, p 25.
10. PENSAMIENTO PROPRIO, 1983, No 6/7, p 11.

11. BARRICADA, Managua, 18 July 1984.
12. ENVIO, Managua, 1982, No 12, p 13.
13. ENVIO, 1983, No 24, p 11.
14. "Estado y Clases Sociales en Managua," Managua, 1982, p 78.
15. Ibid., p 78.
16. Ibid., p 79.
17. AREITO, New York, 1983, Vol IX, No 34, p 15.
18. NUEVA SOCIEDAD, San Jose, 1982, No 63, p 38.
19. ENVIO, 1984, No 37, p 15.
20. AREITO, 1983, Vol IX, No 34, p 15.
21. ENVIO, 1982, No 13, p 1.
22. Ibid.
23. ENVIO, 1984, No 37, pp 9-10, 34.
24. UNIDAD, 1984, No 10, p 3.
25. POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE, No 8, 1984, p 115.
26. AREITO, 1983, Vol IX, No 34, p 14.
27. D. Ortega, Saavedra, Nicaragua. "La Primera Democracia," Managua, 1983, p 5.
28. "Estado y Clases Sociales en Nicaragua," p 15.
29. Ibid., pp 82-83.
30. PENSAMIENTO PROPRIO, 1984, No 15, p 20.
31. "Estado y Clases Sociales en Nicaragua," pp 83-84.
32. "Segunda Unidad de Estudio Para Las CBS," p 30.
33. "Estado y Clases Sociales en Nicaragua," p 47.
34. Ibid., pp 44-45.
35. Ibid., p 60.
36. CUANDERNOS POLITICOS, Mexico, 1983, No 35, p 56.

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LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN

'IMPERIALIST POLICIES' CONCERNING LATIN AMERICAN DEBT

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[Article by L. L. Klochkovskiy, S. N. Lobantsova and N. N. Kholodkov: "The Problem of Debts' in the Policy of Imperialism"]

[Text] In the middle of the 1980's the capitalist world was shaken by another extremely severe crisis--the growth of foreign and internal indebtedness. The shortage of financial resources which was previously typical of the periphery became an immanent feature of the centers as well, having merged with the so-called international "crisis of debts." At its basis lies the large-scale internationalization of the development of a crisis zone of highly developed capitalism which began in the 1970's and finally led, on the one hand, to unprecedented concentration of currency and financial funds in multinational banks and, on the other, to the formation of a large number of debtor countries, mainly in the developing world. Such a "restructuring" of the currency and financial system of capitalism is evidence of the establishment of new relations of "asymmetric interdependency" which are called upon to provide for the reproduction of the world capitalist system under the conditions of expanded aggravation of its antagonisms. In other words, the "crisis of debts" has become long-term and universal in nature, and the problem itself is being transformed into a global one.

But, as practice shows, the most varied approaches to the solution to this problem exist in the modern world, sometimes directly contradictory ones. For this problem has reached its primary significance on the periphery as distinct from the centers. The group of articles offered here is devoted to analyzing the peculiarities of the manifestation and aggravation of the "crisis of debts" in Latin America and distinguishing among the ways of surmounting it which have been proposed.

The crisis of the foreign indebtedness of Latin American countries, which is unprecedented in its scale and destructive force, remains a serious obstacle on the path to their economic development. The unpaid foreign debts are more than triple the value of incomes from exports and amount to almost one-half of the gross national product. The curve of indebtedness continues to rise: in 1982 it reached the point of \$315.3 billion, in 1983--\$340.9 billion, and at the end of 1984--more than \$360 billion.¹

Since August 1982 when Mexico, having ended up in a critical position, stopped payments, a chain of moratoriums followed in succession in the region. During the period of 1982-1983 12 countries asked their creditors for extensions for the payment of their debts. In 1984 a new wave of the crisis began: the extensions granted to a number of debtor states did not rid them of their regular financial fluctuations. In order to avoid bankruptcy six Latin American countries were again forced to resort to extreme measures.

International financial capital and the imperialist powers are taking advantage of the critical situation of the debtors for their own strategic purposes. The crisis of indebtedness which has tied economic, social and political problems into a tight knot has outgrown the framework of the financial sphere and is becoming increasingly political in nature.

Toward the Sources of the Crisis

The development of events has shown that the "crisis of debts" that has been experienced by Latin American countries is not a market phenomenon; from the standpoint of internal factors it is a consequence of the deep structural disproportions in the national economy and defects in the models of development that have prevailed in the region. At the same time an important if not a decisive role has been played by external factors--mainly the predatory policy of the multinational banks and proponents of the goal-directed financial strategy of imperialism.

The past decade has become for Latin America a period of active expansion of foreign capital and increased exploitation of natural, human and production resources. The "bleeding" of the economies of the countries in the region by transnational corporations and banks has ended up in immense financial losses: just because of the transfer abroad of profit and interest on foreign currency (about \$40 billion annually) Latin American countries are losing up to one-fourth of their gross capital investments. To this one must add the continuing financial plundering on the world capitalist markets of technology, freight, cargo insurance and other "international services." On the whole the outflow of funds from Latin America through "legal" and hidden channels, according to our estimates, reaches \$100 billion a year. As the organ of Colombian communists, the newspaper VOZ PROLETARIA, correctly noted, "as the production of national wealth increases in our countries an ever greater part of it is taken out in the form of tributes to imperialism, which limits the possibilities of domestic accumulation."²

The course toward industrialization with the help of foreign capital has ended up in increased dependency of the countries of the region on imported machines, equipment, patents and raw material. Penetrating into the Latin

American economy the TNK's, figuratively speaking, have sucked its juices, using for financing its own expansion local accumulations and credit of transnational banks, which has increased the "debt load" on the payment balances of the receiving states. Attempts on the part of the latter to satisfy the growing demands for currency as a result of increasing imports have been interpreted as protectionist barriers by the developed West, mainly the United States.

At the same time the international financial and credit relations have undergone an essential evolution which has not been favorable for the debtor countries. In essence the imperialist credit strategy itself with respect to the "Third World" has been modified. Within the framework of this strategy the leading capitalist states and the international credit and financial institutions they control have limited the access of the developing countries to the relatively advantageous state credit and loans of the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The Reagan administration is the most consistent proponent of this course. The unprecedented arms race and also the critical problems facing the American economy have required and still do require immense expenditures, and therefore government allocations for credit to developing countries have been severely cut. Official financing, being strictly selective, is more and more frequently used now as a means of direct pressure on Latin American countries and providing for the U.S. military and strategic interests.

The shortage of resources for purposes of development and the reduction of state "assistance" and credit from international financial organizations have forced the countries of the region to resort on a large scale to the "services" of the private loan market in which the transnational banks have unlimited predominance. Including bank monopolies in the granting of credit was one of the main factors in the aggravation of the debt crisis of the Latin American countries.

Nor can one fail to mention the fatal consequences caused by the extensive spreading to Latin America of neoconservative economic concepts, above all monetarism which proclaims and "open" economy, the "self-regulating" role of market forces and the limitation of the economic role of the state.³ Under pressure from the monetarists in many Latin American countries (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and others) liberalization of foreign trade and the movement of capital, weakening of state regulation of the economy, curtailment of the state sector and active enlistment of foreign capital, including loans, became permanent attributes of the model for development. It should be noted that this neoconservative economic doctrine survived on Latin American soil because the goals it pursued and the means of achieving them ("freezing" the wages of the workers, providing for free access of foreign capital to the economy, extensive utilization of foreign credit and so forth) suited as never before the reactionary circles who had come into power in a number of countries in the first half and middle of the 1970's. It is understandable that for the right-wing regimes the enlistment of foreign credit was much to be preferred over carrying out progressive internal transformations, particularly in the credit and finance sphere.

Under the conditions of monetaristic "liberalization" whereby state regulation of the economy was essentially cut off and currency limitations almost did not exist, credit from the multinational banks became easily available to borrowers of any rank. Beginning in the middle of the 1970's foreign loan capital literally flooded Latin America. The lack of strict state control over the financial operations of the local bourgeoisie ended up not only in the growth of foreign indebtedness--the freedom of movement of financial flows resulted in Latin American capital flowing outside the country.

As we know, in 1981 the Reagan administration, in order to strengthen the dollar and make the American economy "healthier," sharply increased the bank interest rate. Latin American investors looking for more profitable investments of capital began to transfer it to American banks on a mass scale and then, when Western European countries followed the U.S. example, two banks in Switzerland, England and other states.

As one can see from the Mexican press, about \$150 billion from other countries of the region remained in accounts in private investment banks (mainly American) in the form of deposits.⁴ There had been nothing like this mass outpouring of local capital in the past, but the main thing lay elsewhere: this process reached its apogee precisely during that period when the currency and financial base of the Latin American states had already been essentially undermined, when the payments on large foreign loans had come due, and the foreign currency reserves had been exhausted.

When analyzing the causes of the long-lived crisis many bourgeois researchers point out the irrational, unproductive utilization of foreign credit by countries of the region. Indeed, a large part of the loan capital that was obtained was used to pay for importing consumer goods, particularly costly luxurious items, and also for purchasing arms, especially in countries with dictatorial and right-wing authoritarian regimes. As for the production sphere, here the borrowed money was basically invested in objects with a slow return on expenditures. But still most of the responsibility for the unprecedented foreign debt of Latin American countries belongs to the transnational corporations and international financial capital operating in them: according to several estimates, at the beginning of the 1980's about one-third of the overall sum of the region's foreign debt (about \$100 billion was attributed to branches of multinational corporations).⁵ The purposive strategy of the imperialist powers and the credit policy of the multinational banks brought about a sharp increase in the indebtedness of Latin American countries to world commercial banks (by 1983 they accounted for \$202 billion of the overall sum of \$341 billion) and on the whole the increased dependency of the region on the random nature of the world capitalist economy.

Under the Dictatorship of International Financial Capital

This fact is from history: in 1982 Venezuela, which was in a difficult financial position, declared a moratorium on foreign debts. Then the creditor countries--England, Germany and Italy--sent to Venezuelan shores a combined squadron which "regulated" the problem: as compensation for the overdue payments they used force to take over the customs warehouses filled with goods that were intended for export. Of course times have changed and the

imperialist states can no longer act in such a matter. The "gunboat diplomacy" has given way to more refined but no less effective methods, but to this day "gunboat diplomacy" has not receded into the past.

The first reaction of world bankers to the moratoriums declared by the Latin American countries was simple: fearing the loss of immense sums and, as a minimum, a considerable reduction of profit, they sharply limited credit and in a number of cases refused to grant credit to the debtor countries. These harsh measures caused alarm in the upper echelons of power in the imperialist states who saw in the "stubbornness" of the private creditors an incomparably greater danger--the possibility of destabilizing the political situation in the region. Expressing these misgivings, the American WALL STREET JOURNAL wrote: "In Latin America such 'harshness' could contribute to the formation of political platforms for left wing and anti-American movements, and this threatens more than just the loss of profit by the banks."⁶

This kind of outlook forced the creditor to make efforts to "save" the debtors. The "rescue operations" were headed by the leading institute for state monopolistic regulation of the credit and financial sphere--the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is under the direct control of the United States. In order to strengthen the disciplinary influence of the fund on the debtors, private commercial banks, coordination committees of creditors and central banks of developed capitalist states represented by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) began to follow a coordinated credit policy. The following system was developed for considering requests of debtor nations: acceptance of the conditions of the Fund, intermediate loans from the DIS, refinancing of debts and granting of postponements by world commercial banks.

The partial and short-term alleviation of the debt burden is accompanied by strict requirements of an economic and sometimes also of a political nature: for example, they sharply reduce state allocations for the needs of social development, abolish currency limitations, improve the "investment climate" for foreign investors, and so forth.⁷ In other words, the Latin American countries are given the opportunity to emerge from their crisis using all of the same monetaristic formulas, and moreover reliance is placed on the "favorable" influence of investments of the TNK's. Thus speaking at a session of the IMF and the IBRD in 1983 the director and manager of the IMF, J. Larosiére announced: "The countries experiencing a crisis of debts must take effective measures to enlist direct foreign investments...since they provide the possibility of reducing the influx of financing from outside and limiting the growth of the foreign debt."⁸ But the events of past years have completely refuted such assertions, proving that it is precisely the investments of the TNKs and the activity of their branches in the Latin American countries that have become one of the main reasons for the aggravation of the region's financial problems.

The acceptance of the monetaristic formulas of the fund has a negative effect on the economic development of the debtor countries. A sharp reduction of imports leads to a freezing of many objects of economic construction and paralyzes new capital investments. The decline in production has led to unrestrained growth of unemployment. Thus in Chile the number of unemployed had increased by 19 percent in 1983 and by 18.6 percent in 1984. The

situation was similar in Uruguay, Argentina and other countries. The first year of the implementation of the IMF programs produced striking results: the GNP for the region as a whole dropped by 3.1 percent, and per capita--by 5.3 percent; the national income per capita dropped by 5.7 percent.⁹ The attack on the positions of the state sector, the reduction of allocations for social needs, the abolition of subsidies for consumer goods that are in daily demand and the "freezing" of wages have a direct effect on the material position of the workers. It is no accident that the requirements of the IMF are accompanied, as a rule, by an increase in social tension as was the case, for example, in Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Panama and the Dominican Republic.

The programs imposed by the fund are being realized in Latin America at the price of immense efforts, compromises and losses. And at the first signs of insubordination the imperialist creditors "shut off the oxygen" to the debtor country by discontinuing the credit. Suffice it to recall the precedent of 1983 when the IMF stopped the payment to Brazil of the next part of the loan stipulated by the agreement because of the fact that the country's government "had not met all the requirements" of the fund. This measure served as a signal for the world commercial banks which also halted credit. Only after the acceptance of new conditions from the IMF did Brazil gain access to the loan funds. The same devices applied against Argentina: in March of this year the fund halted the payment of part of the credit stipulated in an agreement made at the end of 1984. The reason was the country's failure to fulfill a number of instructions of the IMF. After this the United States called a halt to the negotiations on the issue of granting Argentina credit from the American treasury.

If international financial capital exerts pressure, and not without success, on such large and relatively developed states as Argentina and Brazil, it need not even think twice about small and economically backward problems. Lenin's proposition remains quite timely: "Financial capital is such a large, one might say, decisive force in all economic and all international relations that it is capable of subordinating to itself and in reality does subordinate even states which have the most complete political independence."¹⁰

By granting postponements for the fulfillment of commitments, that is, by giving the debtors only a temporary respite, the Western creditors deliberately ignore the obvious fact that the "problem of debts" was generated by the deepening crisis of the socioeconomic structures of Latin American countries and the existing credit and financial system of capitalism. Such a tactic was dictated by the desire to maintain the status quo in relations with Latin American states, which makes it possible for international monopolistic capital to pump material and financial resources out of them in ever increasing volumes. The foreign indebtedness of the region, which is being assiduously "cultivated" by imperialist powers plays an important role in their expansionist strategy.

The United States, for example, is trying to turn the "problem of debts" into a permanent instrument of pressure on the Latin American countries. By weakening or tightening their noose of debts, depending on the degree of loyalty of the debtor countries, Washington is trying not only to establish control over the socioeconomic processes taking place within them, but also to

make them obediently follow the course of their foreign policy, particularly with respect to Central America, and to drag them in to the global strategy of fighting against "world communism."

The "stabilization programs" imposed on the Latin American countries by the International Monetary Fund give the United States the possibility of intervening directly in their internal political life. For on instructions from Washington the IMF can at any moment and under any pretext nullify the credit agreement, which places the other side in a hopeless position. It is precisely thus, by utilizing formal pretexts of an economic nature, that they achieve their far-reaching political goals. In this connection let us recall once again how the fund nullified previously concluded agreements with Argentina and Brazil. Behind these changes lies Washington's desire not to allow further development of progressive tendencies in the sociopolitical life of these countries.

It seems quite predictable that the United States, like the IMF, relies in its credit policy on strengthening the foreign positions of American private capital. To this end Washington is increasingly perpetuating in the region the idea of the need for more extensive utilization of the production and financial potential of the TNK's for the most rapid surmounting of the crisis of indebtedness. Speaking at the 14th session of the OAS [Organization of American States] (Brazil, November 1984) U.S. Secretary of State G. Schulz called upon the Latin American countries to step up their course toward enlisting direct private foreign investments and made a proposal "to transform long-term commitments into direct foreign capital investments." The former secretary of finance D. Regan in general suggested that the debtors begin to sell off national properties so as to apply the money they receive for paying off the foreign debt. In practice the adoption of such formulas would mean a transfer into the hands of the TNKs of the best land and the most profitable industrial enterprises, and the money received by the Latin American countries from the sale would soon also end up in the safes of the transnational banks in the form of payment of interest on the foreign debt.

By imposing its own methods of "resolving" the debt crisis on Latin American countries Washington is ignoring their justified demands to reduce the bank interest rate, to abolish the limitations on the importing of goods from Latin American countries, and to stabilize prices for raw materials.

With such an approach is it really possible to believe the statements of the Reagan administration concerning the desire to contribute to the stabilization of the economies and the flourishing of the Latin American countries? Obviously not. The concepts of economic development which have been worked out in the brain centers of the West and imposed upon the states of the region with increased force have for 4 decades now pursued only one goal: to subject the national economies to foreign control and to provide for maximum profit for the monopolistic capital of developed countries of the West which are operating in them. It is no accident that Brazil, having been for the past 20 years an object of "special concern" on the part of Washington and the IMF, has become the largest debtor in the world. The strained economic situation remains in Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Peru and a number of other Latin American countries. The "charity" of the imperialist

guardians in dealing with Jamaica led this country into the deepest crisis. In 1984 its trade deficit reached \$500 million as compared to \$75 million in 1980, and the load on production capacities in industry dropped to 50 percent.¹² The financial and trade-economic policy of the White House in its destructive influence on the Latin American economy is indeed incomparable, in the figurative words of Argentine President R. Alfonsín, with a kind of "neutron bomb which while leaving everything living untouched, destroys the production potential."¹³

Having placed the burden of crisis on the states of the region, the United States is striving to deprive them of the freedom to choose the means and methods of loosening the grip of indebtedness. A real confirmation of this is Washington's strengthening of trade protectionism. In 1984 for example the United States introduced limitations on the imports of 200 kinds of goods, including products of the Latin American metallurgy, light and food industries, agricultural goods and so forth.¹⁴ The permanent secretary of the Latin American Economic System, S. Alegret, accused the United States of conducting a foreign trade policy that was directed toward limiting the economic development of the countries in the region.¹⁵ Indeed, solely as a result of the foreign trade protectionism of the imperialist powers and their policy of reducing prices for mineral and agricultural raw material the annual losses of the Latin American states amount to about \$20 billion.¹⁶

Still, along with blackmail and direct pressure, the developed capitalist countries in a number of cases also take advantage of the tactic of partial concessions and compromises, trying not to let the contradictions grow into a direct confrontation, the creation of a unified front of the debtor countries and, in the final analysis, the collapse of the system of international financial and credit relations. Additionally the economic crisis in the region objectively impedes expansion of international monopolistic capital. The "flexibility" is manifested particularly in granting somewhat longer extensions for repayment of credit and easing of the conditions for new loans.

In Search of Alternatives

In spite of the "rescue actions" undertaken by the IMF and private banks of the West the Latin American foreign debt is not only not decreasing but, on the contrary, is continuing to increase at rapid rates. The real threat of permanent financial bondage is forcing the Latin American countries to sharply activate the searches for a way out of the crisis situation.

Life has shown that any positive changes can be achieved only with joint actions. The economic conference of Latin American countries in Quito (January 1984) was an important step toward strengthening unity. The resolutions adopted at it show the desire of the Latin American countries to develop a unified and comprehensive approach to solving the problems that face them. The provisions contained in the summary document concerning the need to realize basic principles of a new international economic order and to curtail the arms race show the growing interest of the nations of the region in improving the international climate as a whole and eliminating the system of relations that has developed within the framework of world capitalism which provides the imperialist powers with unilateral advantages and privileges.

A concrete embodiment of the appeal for unity proclaimed in Quito was the "Cartagena Group" created soon thereafter which joined together 11 Latin American countries and was essentially the first real attempt to coordinate forces in order to solve the problem of indebtedness. At subsequent conferences of the "Cartagena group" in Mar del Plata (Argentina) and in Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) they discuss practical measures for loosening the grip of the crisis.

An analysis of the revolution of the policy of the Latin American states in the credit and financial sphere makes it possible to single out the following characteristic features. In the first place the majority of countries of the region recognize the indisputable fact that the program for "stabilization and improvement" of the economy developed by the International Monetary Fund are not only not leading to a solution to the problem, but are even increasing the tension and giving rise to more crucial contradictions. It has become obvious that the problem of indebtedness is becoming increasingly political in nature and that in order to solve it it is necessary to take the corresponding measures at the international level. In the second place, the question of the need for a comprehensive approach to the problem is becoming more and more definite since (and the broadest circles of the Latin American community are beginning to understand this) this aggravation is caused not by any temporary disturbances in the production cycle of the developed capitalist states, but by a deepening of the structural disproportions in the world capitalist economy and in the Latin American countries themselves. In the third place, as one can see from the documents of the conference in Quito, the way out of the crisis is closely connected to the solutions to such worldwide global problems as halting the arms race and radically restructuring international economic relations.

At the same time, along with the tendency toward greater coordination of positions and evaluations, there continues to be an essential difference between the declarations proclaimed by the countries of the region and their concrete implementation. The desire for unity of actions is neutralized to a certain degree by differences in the approach to the question of the nature of joint actions in counterbalance to the increasingly aggressive foreign political policy of imperialism. It is these differences in particular that have become one of the main obstacles on the path to achieving more appreciable results in the activity of the "Cartagena Group." The fact is that a number of countries of the region are striving to conduct a policy of appeasement, to make compromises in order to obtain as compensation for their "loyalty" additional concessions on the part of the creditors. Naturally, such a line is actively supported by the transnational banks and the international credit and finance institutes which are using various means to drive wedges in between the debtor countries.

An objective analysis of the problem of indebtedness shows that this is a multifactoral phenomenon. The internal and external causes of the crisis are mutually conditioned and are strictly determined both by the peculiarities of the socioeconomic structures existing in the Latin American countries and the models of development they have adopted, on the one hand, and by the existing system of economic relations with developed capitalist states, on the other.

The measures taken by countries of the region to limit domestic consumption and imports in order to reduce expenditures and hard currency and by so doing mobilize internal resources in order to settle their foreign financial commitments are fundamentally contradictory and cannot essentially alleviate the crisis situation in the credit and financial sphere. Continuing to introduce monetaristic formulas under pressure from the IMF, certain Latin American countries are essentially following their previous policy under new conditions. Under final analysis this means further economic disarmament in the face of imperialism and increasing subordination of production potential and material resources to the interests of the international monopolistic capital and the local financial oligarchy which is closely related to it.

Historical experience shows that it is possible to break the vicious circle of dependency only if progressive socioeconomic transformations are made and the developing states step up their joint actions in the fight against neocolonialism and for a radical restructuring of trade, economic and credit relations with developed capitalist powers. In an interview in the Mexican newspaper EXCELSIOR Fidel Castro emphasized: "The new world economic policy should mean their conditions for exchange for all countries of the Third World.... It is not fair to pay pennies for cacao, tea and coffee...for mineral ore and other raw materials in order to produce aircraft carriers, strategic missiles, nuclear submarines and at the same time allot funds for 'Star Wars.' These funds should be used to fight famine, and precisely here on earth. If the countries of Latin America and the Third World take a firm and united position they will for the first time have a real opportunity to achieve these goals, beginning with the problem of foreign indebtedness."¹⁷

Giving in this connection the example of the credit-financial policy of the Soviet Union and its CEMA partners, Fidel Castro noted: "The socialist countries do not apply any protectionist measures against us.... Our financial difficulties...are resolved immediately and unimpededly.... This means that if the industrially developed capitalist countries were to apply the form of exchange and the economic and financial relations which we have with the countries of the socialist community the aforementioned problems (debts--ed.) would be solved and the development of the Third World countries would be ensured."¹⁸

The USSR and other socialist states resolutely reject the course followed by the imperialist powers toward the utilization of financial levers for enslaving developing countries, particularly Latin American ones, in debt even more, and they are in favor of regulating the problem of foreign indebtedness taking into account their inherent interests and the responsibility which should be borne here by imperialist powers--which are mainly to blame for the unprecedented difficulties that are being experienced by the region. This was clearly and unequivocally expressed in the declaration "Preservation of Peace and International Economic Cooperation," adopted at the high-level economic conference of the CEMA countries which was held in Moscow in June 1984.¹⁹

Occupying a constructive position with respect to questions of restructuring international economic relations, the CEMA countries are resolutely in favor of most rapidly meeting the requirements contained the charter of economic

rights and responsibilities of states and the declaration concerning the establishment of a new international economic policy. The Soviet Union has repeatedly emphasized that a reduction of military expenditures and the utilization of the released funds for production purposes is a cardinal path to solving the economic problems facing mankind.

The USSR adherence to the fundamental principles of international relations, particularly in the credit and finance sphere, is confirmed in practice. Credit granted by our country to developing states serves as an additional incentive for their economic development and it is distinguished favorably from the usurious credit of the transnational banks both in terms of the level of the interest rate and in terms of the conditions for repayment.

An especially important fact is that the Latin American countries are paying off Soviet credit with deliveries of industrial and agricultural goods. This contributes to expansion of national exports on a stable and long-term basis. The conclusion of the Soviet-Peruvian agreement in 1983 was met with a good deal of approval in the region. According to it Peru, which is experiencing the most crucial financial crisis, was given the opportunity to pay off Soviet credit with deliveries of its traditional goods. Such an approach to regulating the problem of indebtedness corresponds to the basic interests of the Latin American countries. As the Peruvian newspaper DIARIO noted, such an agreement is "exceptional in the history of foreign indebtedness crisis of Latin America...and opens up new prospects for overcoming it."²⁰

Taking into account the fact that relief from the burden of debts can be achieved through the development of export branches, the CEMA countries are prepared to continue in the future to render all-around assistance to the Latin American states in the construction and technical equipment of enterprises and productions that are oriented toward exports. Then reimbursement for economic and technical assistance can be made on a compensatory basis, that is, through deliveries of the products of these enterprises.

By the beginning of the 1980's, with the participation of the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries, 140 industrial and other facilities were put into operation and turned over for complete ownership by Latin American states, and 62 facilities were in the stage of construction or were being planned.²¹

The USSR and other countries of the socialist community are striving to develop relations with Latin America on a mutually advantageous and balanced basis. As was noted in the declaration of the CEMA countries, they will continue in the future to render as much economic and technical assistance as they can to the states that have won freedom and independence in their efforts to develop their national economies.

FOOTNOTES

1. "CEPAL, Notas Sobre la Economia y el Desarrollo de America Latina." Santiago, January 1985. According to other estimates, the sum of foreign indebtedness in the region reached \$400 billion.
2. VOZ PROLETARIA, Bogota, 26 May 1983.

3. For more detail concerning the essence and consequences of the introduction of monetaristic formulas in the region see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 9, 1984, pp 18-27.
4. EL FINANCIERO, Mexico, 11 October 1984.
5. See ECONOMIA DE AMERICA LATINA, Buenos Aires, No 11, 1984.
6. WALL STREET JOURNAL, New York, 14 October 1983.
7. For more detail see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 9, 1984 pp 18-27.
8. J. Larosiere, "The International Monetary Fund: Recovery and Development," Washington, 1983, p 4.
9. "Notas Sobre la Economia...", p 13.
10. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 27, p 379.
11. PRISNA LATINOAMERICA LA HABANA, 1985, No 1, pp 41, 42.
12. GRANMA, Havana, 16 March 1985.
13. VOZ BOGOTA, 24 May 1984.
14. GRANMA, 5 April 1985.
15. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 20 November 1984.
16. GRANMA, 4 April 1985.
17. F. Castro. "The Unpaid Foreign Debt of Latin America and the Third World. How It Can and Should Be Abolished. The Immediate Need for a New International Economic Policy," interview for the Mexican newspaper EXCELSIOR, Havana, 1985, pp 96-97.
18. Ibid., pp 57, 58.
19. For more detail see: "The High-Level Conference of the CEMA Countries," 12-14 June 1984, documents and materials, Moscow, 1984, p 36.
20. DIARIO, Lima, 28 February 1984.
21. "Ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV" [The Economic Cooperation of the CEMA Countries], Moscow, 1982, p 49.

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LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN

CUBAN-ANGOLAN RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, 1985 pp 70-76

[Article by P. P. Yamashkin: "Cuba-Angola: Internationalism in Action"]

[Text] In the international activity of socialist Cuba a prominent place is occupied by relations with the countries of Africa. As was emphasized in the resolution concerning foreign policy which was adopted at the second congress of the Cuban Community Party, "within the framework of our interstate relations a special position is occupied by ties of friendship and cooperation which link our homeland to those countries of Asia and Africa which are constructing socialism or after the victory over the oppressors have decided to proceed toward this goal in keeping with the principles of Marxism--Leninism."¹

One of these countries is Angola, with which our relations embody the firm foreign political line of revolutionary Cuba toward the support of the national liberation process on the African continent. Based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, Cuba along with other socialist countries is conducting a policy of active cooperation with Angola, is supporting its struggle for the consolidation of political and economic independence, and is defending its interests in direct opposition to imperialist and racist forces.

From the very beginning of the armed struggle of the Angolan patriots Cuba established contacts with them. The impassioned internationalist Ernesto Che Guevara played an eminent role in strengthening these. In 1965 he and his military advisers in Sierra Maestre, participating in the struggle against the pro-imperialist regime of the Congo (Kinshasa) established ties also with leaders of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] whose main base was in Brazzaville at that time.² One of the partisan colonies trained by Cuban internationalists was given the name "Column of Camilo Cienfuegos."

In the second half of the 1960's Cuba continued to develop all-around cooperation with the MPLA. In 1966 the leader of this movement, A. Neto, visited Havana for the first time. During his visit they reached an agreement for Cuba to render assistance to the MPLA and the training of military personnel.³

Military cooperation between Cuban revolutionaries and Angolan patriots thus have long-lived traditions. Therefore the solidarity of the Cuban people with Angola which was manifested at the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 was a logical continuation of the consistent policy of proletarian internationalism which the Cuban revolution has followed since the very beginning with respect to the African national liberation process.

The solidarity between Cuba and Angola confirmed once again that the success of the national liberation struggle is determined not only by internal objective and subjective factors, but also depends largely on international conditions, relationships and the alignment of forces both on the worldwide and on the regional scale, and on the degree of readiness and capability of the progressive forces of the world to render decisive support in repulsing the attempts of imperialism and their allies to halt the irreversible course of history. It was precisely because of the prompt and effective decision made by the Cuban government to send military subdivisions to Angola, which was supported by the Soviet Union and many other countries, that they managed to quickly cut off the "blitzkrieg" aggressors. Along with fighters of the MPLA Cuban soldiers and officers for several months (from the middle of November 1975 until the end of March 1976) liberated from the South African and Zaire interventionists and also the marionette groupings of the FNLA and UNITA an immense territory of Angola with minimal human losses. Expressing their gratitude to the Cuban people, the first president of the People's Republic of Angola, A. Neto, declared that "the Cubans are a people who inherently have a revolutionary sense of internationalism."⁴

The staunch adherence to Leninist principles of support of national liberation movements and the deep historical and cultural-ethnic traditions which link Cuba and the African peoples, and also the peculiarities of the liberation process in this country have contributed to the formation of traditional class solidarity of the communist party and the people of Cuba with the patriots who are fighting against imperialism.

The cooperation between Cuba and Angola, which is carried out on the basis of the agreement of 1976, encompasses various areas: political, economic, military and so forth. The relations between the two countries go far beyond the framework of ordinary international relations and are increasingly assuming the nature of fraternal friendship and mutual assistance. Describing Angolan-Cuban relations, A. Neto noted: "What unites is ideology, the overall goals and the concrete form of realizing in practice that which we have dreamed of for many years."⁵

The political ties between Cuba and Angola are varied in nature. A special place among them belongs to the meetings of state and party figures. These meetings are conducted regularly. In joint documents one always notices the agreement on points of view regarding the main international problems and the resolve to oppose the aggressive policy of imperialism and racism and to support the struggle of the African people for freedom and independence.

Cuba and Angola actively support all peaceful initiatives which are directed toward limiting the arms race and avoiding another world war. The two countries interact closely within the framework of the nonalliance movement.

Extensive interparty cooperation is carried out between the communist party of Cuba and the MPLA-Labor Party. This shows the great interest the Angolans have in the practice of party construction. The agreement to cooperate in the area of political and ideological education of 1978 envisioned rendering assistance to the MPLA in training party personnel, developing training programs and aides, improving the system of party political training and so forth. Interparty cooperation contributes to the ideological-political and organizational strengthening of the MPLA-Labor Party and to transforming it into a real vanguard of the Angolan people.

Cuban experience is very significant in solving the crucial social and economic problems of Angola. Along with the other socialist countries Cuba is rendering assistance to Angola in restoring the country's economy which was destroyed as a result of aggression. To these ends hundreds of Cuban internationalists working in various branches of the economy of Angola. They are building bridges, constructing buildings, schools and hospitals, and so forth. Cuban builders have carried out reconstruction of the water supply system in the city of Luanda. In 1983 an agreement was concluded for expanding the seaport of the capital of Angola.⁶ Various kinds of assistance is being rendered in the area of agriculture--mainly in raising and harvesting sugar cane and coffee--and in the organization and planning of agricultural work.⁷

Portuguese colonialism left a difficult legacy to the Angolan people: at the time they won their independence more than 90 percent of the country's population were illiterate, there were no educators and there were no schools. Therefore one of the most important measures of the republic, which is being carried out with the assistance of socialist countries, was the campaign to eliminate illiteracy. A Cuban detachment of Internationalist Educators imeni Ernesto Che Guevera began working in Angola in 1978, and in 1979--The Brigade of Primary Grade Teachers imeni Frank Pais. About 5,000 Cuban teachers have worked in these detachments and brigades in Angola.⁸ Cuban teachers are also working in the higher educational institutions of Angola.

A large number of Angolan boys and girls are studying in the higher and specialized training institutions in Cuba. From 1976 through 1983 they were granted more than 15,000 stipends.⁹

Another important sphere of cooperation between Cuba and Angola is public health. Cuban physicians rendered assistance to Angolan patriots as early as the 1960's, during the liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonizers, at a time when there were not enough medical workers in Cuba itself. During the first months of popular power, after many Portuguese specialists had left Angola, a real threat of an epidemic appeared in the country and there was a critical shortage of medications. Cuba was one of the first to come to the assistance of the Angolan people. Cuban physicians began mass vaccination of the population against tropical diseases, and 19 medical courses were also opened for training local personnel.¹⁰ At the present time Cuba is continuing to render significant assistance to Angola in the matter of improving medical service for the population. Many Angolans are obtaining a medical education in Cuba.

Extensive contacts are developing between the two countries in the area of culture and art. In 1982 a program was signed for cultural exchanges during 1982-1984 which envisions the exchange of delegations of the public, artistic collectives, exhibits and so forth. Cuba is sending its specialists to Angola to render assistance in the development of various kinds of art: theater, music, dance, cinematography and literature.

In arranging contacts with the Angolan public and in international work with Angolans studying in Cuba a large amount of work is being done by the Association for Cuban and African Friendship which is a constituent part of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With Peoples of Foreign Countries. Festivals of friendship conducted with the participation of Angolan college and high school students who are studying in Cuba have become traditional.

An important sphere of bilateral relations is cooperation in the military area. In keeping with the agreement between the governments Cuban military specialists are located in Angola. They are playing a large role in the organization and training of the national armed forces and they are a serious factor which impedes the relentless aggressive actions on the part of the UAR and the U.S. counterrevolutionary bands which it supports.

From the very beginning this situation did not suit the U.S. administration and Pretoria, which were striving to destroy the popular system in Angola and to suppress the national liberation movement in the south of Africa, especially the struggle of the SWAPO [Southwest Africa People's Organization] in Namibia and the African National Congress in the UAR. Within the framework of "total confrontation" with communism the United States submitted the treacherous idea of "coordinating" the granting of independence to Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.¹¹ Racists in the UAR immediately seized upon this idea, saying that they would take their occupation forces out of Namibia only on the condition that Cuban units evacuate Angola. The United States and the UAR were pursuing a quite specific goal--prolonging the process of granting independence to Namibia, creating conditions for putting into power there the marionette government which is obedient to them, eliminating the SWAPO and also, once the Cuban troops had been removed from Angola, trying through the forces of UNITA with the help of the UAR to destabilize the progressive regime in Angola.

This maneuver was unmasked in a joint Cuban-Angolan announcement of 4 February 1982.¹² The justified position of Cuba and Angola was given broad support throughout the world. The idea of "coordinating" was rejected in the UN by the Movement for Nonalliance and the Organization for African Unity. As was noted in a message from the president of the Organization for African Unity at that time, Mengistu Haile Mariam to the UN Council on Namibia, "attempts on the part of the United States and the UAR to link the issue of granting independence to Namibia to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola not only impedes the process of decolonialization of Namibia, but is also outright intervention in the internal affairs of Angola."

After the failure of a chance to destabilize the popular authorities in Angola by diplomatic means, the United States and the racists again resorted to

military force. But the armed aggression of the UAR at the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984 demonstrated the higher level of military readiness of the National Armed Forces of Angola and the interventionists sustained serious losses.

Then the United States and the UAR changed their tactics again. Realizing that they could not achieve their goals through military means and also taking into account the fact that the idea of "coordination" found no support even among certain Western powers, the U.S. administration and the Pretoria regime began to push through new variants of "regulation" of the problem and began to speak of "parallel" withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops and American guarantees to Angola in the event that the Cubans left. Utilizing methods of "shuttle diplomacy," the United States began to "cultivate" Angola and other "front-line" states so that they would establish a dialogue with the UAR. At the same time Washington also "prompted" the UAR to enter into negotiations with these countries, trying to bring the apartheid regime out of international isolation.

The position of Angola and Cuba was confirmed in March 1984 in a joint Cuban-Angolan declaration in which both sides, having confirmed their adherence to the provisions of the joint announcement of 4 February 1982, emphasized that they would renew, by their own decision and in keeping with their own sovereign rights, the stage-by-stage withdrawal of the internationalist Cuban military contingent immediately after the following conditions were met: unilateral withdrawal of racist UAR troops from the territory of Angola; complete fulfillment of Resolution 435 of the UN Security Council, the granting of real independence to Namibia and the complete withdrawal of South African troops which are illegally occupying the territory of this country; the cessation of acts of direct aggression or threat of aggression against Angola and also any support to the counterrevolutionary organization of UNITA and any other marionette grouping on the part of the UAR, the United States and their allies.¹⁴

These just demands encountered strong resistance from the United States and the UAR. Under the pretense of stepping up the actions of the SWAPO from the territory of Angola, the UAR failed to fulfill its commitments concerning the withdrawal of troops from the southern regions of Angola. The Pretoria regime in May 1984 broke off negotiations with the SWAPO concerning the cease-fire in Namibia as the first step on the path to its decolonization and again made the demand of "coordinating" this problem with the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola.

At the same time the United States and the UAR are continuing to support the UNITA bands which have unleashed real terror against the Cuban specialists. On 19 April 1984 in the Angolan city of Huambo a barbaric deed was committed which resulted in the death of 14 Cuban construction workers. As was noted in the lead article of the newspaper GRANMA, "the responsibility for this terrorist act lies on those who finance, arm, train and send counterrevolutionary bands against Angola."¹⁵

The monstrous crime not only did not achieve its main goal--to frighten the Cuban people--but, on the contrary, evoked a widespread campaign of solidarity

with Angola. Immediately after the explosion in Huambo more than 30,000 construction workers from Havana alone expressed their readiness to take the places of their comrades who had died.¹⁶

As was emphasized in the Cuban-Angolan declaration, "the government of the People's Republic of Angola expresses the infinite gratitude of the Angolan people to the Cuban people for the international assistance which are they rendering during the first 2 decades of the liberation struggle and their warm recognition of the total of 150,000 Cubans who, exhibiting self-sacrifice and heroism, in various years have made an invaluable contribution in both the military and civilian areas.... Thus they have rendered assistance to the cause of all peoples on the continent."¹⁷

Cuba and Angola, resolutely repulsing all attempts on the part of imperialist and racist forces to block the process of granting independence to Namibia under fabricated and groundless pretexts, are in favor of a political resolution to the conflict in this region of the world. F. Castro, having resolutely criticized the assertion of bourgeois propaganda concerning the "hidden motives" of the Cuban military presence in Angola, has repeatedly noted Cuba's interest in a political resolution to the problems in the south of Africa. Evidence of this was the constructive proposals contained in the message from Angolan President E. dos Santos to the general secretary of the UN in November 1984 in which he expressed his readiness to carry out a gradual withdrawal of Cuban internationalists from the southern regions of Angola if Resolution No 435 of the U.S. Security Council concerning independence of Namibia were realized.

The United States and the UAR again rejected these constructive initiatives on the part of Angola and Cuba.

Taking the existing situation into account, the refusal of the apartheid regime, which is supported by the United States, to accept the peaceful initiatives of Angola, Fidel Castro emphasized: "If there is no solution that is acceptable to Angola we shall continue to render assistance to this country as long as it is needed."¹⁸

The Cuban international policy with respect to Angola has great international significance and it is finding support from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This was again confirmed during the course of the Soviet-Angolan-Cuban talks that were held in January 1984 and March 1985 in Moscow, at which they reached an agreement concerning rendering assistance in the matter of strengthening the defense capability, independence and territorial integrity of Angola.

The policy of fraternal friendship and solidarity which is being followed by Cuba with respect to Angola is helping the Angolan people to ward off imperialist and racist intrigues and is serving the cause of strengthening the unity and cooperation of the progressive countries of Africa with the countries of the socialist community.

FOOTNOTES

1. Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba--Havana, 17-20 December 1980, Moscow, 1980, pp 288-289.
2. See: O. Vilches, "Angola Asalta el Cielo," Havana, 1980, p 136.
3. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 4, 1984, p 29.
4. The visit to the Soviet Union of the party-government delegation from the PRA, 7-13 October 1976, Moscow, 1976, pp 14-15.
5. See: BOHEMIA, Havana, No 35, 1983, p 60.
6. KUBA, 1983, No 11, pp 39-40.
7. For more detail see: CUBA INTERNACIONAL, Havana, No 7, 1984, pp 63-65.
8. BOHEMIA, No 11, 1984, pp 10-11.
9. "GRANMA. Resumem Semanal," 12 February 1984.
10. BOHEMIA, No 39, 1983, pp 62-65.
11. See: "Belyy dom i chernyy kontinent" [The White House and the Black Continent], Moscow, 1984, pp 75-89.
12. GRANMA, Havana, 6 February 1982.
13. IZVESTIYA, 29 August 1984.
14. GRANMA, 20 March 1984.
15. GRANMA, 25 April 1984.
16. See: "GRANMA. Resumem Semanal," 6 May 1984.
17. GRANMA, 20 March 1984.
18. GRANMA, 11 February 1985.

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LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN

INTERVIEW WITH PERUVIAN UNION ACTIVISTS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, 1985 pp 92-95

[Interview with Isidoro Gamarra, chairman of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), Julio Crusado, general secretary of the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP), and Miguel Bernasa, secretary for organizational problems of the National Confederation of Workers (CNT): "In the Struggle for the Social Rights of the Workers"]

[Text] The magazine's editorial staff was visited by a Peruvian trade union delegation including representatives of these three leading trade union organizations of the country. A correspondent's questions were answered by: Isidoro Gamarra, chairman of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers, Julio Crusado, general secretary of the Confederation of Peruvian Workers, and Miguel Bernasa, secretary for organizational problems of the National Confederation of Workers.

[Question] What factors are influencing the development of the trade union and labor movement?

I. Gamarra: Peru is having an extremely hard time with the economic crisis. Trade union organizations are operating under conditions of a constant lowering of the standard of living of the workers. Our national currency continues to lose purchasing power. The prices of necessities and the basic foodstuffs, particularly those such as meat, sugar and potatoes, are increasing at dizzying rates.

Instead of exporters of a number of agricultural products we have become importers of them. One of the reasons for the situation is that the Belaunde Terry government in its desire to "disassemble" the agrarian reform has not been concerned about intensification of agricultural production and has refused credit to agrarian and agroindustrial cooperatives and communities.

Poverty and mass unemployment are on the rise. As a result, the curses of the social system are becoming worse--crime, narcomania and prostitution.

J. Crusado: I too should like to say a couple of words about the crisis in the area of economics. The real wages of the workers have decreased to one-tenth the previous amount! From time to time there is a kind of hike in wages in order to keep up with the growing cost of living. But nonetheless the difference between the real and the nominal wages remains.

The gross national product is not increasing. Industrial production capacities are loaded by only 40-50 percent.

The crisis has been brought about by a number of factors. Among them one can include, in particular, mistakes on the part of the administration in the development of the economic course, and the low and sometimes simply unsatisfactory level of management of the economy. But a special role is played by the foreign debt which has reached \$13 billion. This means that there is a foreign debt of \$700 for every Peruvian.

We see the solution to the problem of the foreign debt in conducting negotiations to refinance it, acting with a unified front with other Latin American debtor countries. The problem of relations with the International Monetary Fund is not only of a purely economic nature. For us this is primarily a social problem. It is also a political problem. And we are reaching a point where the government is arming itself with the tactics we are suggesting.

[Question] Do the trade union organizations all have the same point of view regarding the problem of paying the foreign debt?

J. Crusado: On the whole all the positions coincide here. And this pertains not only to trade unions, but also to individual political organizations. For example the APRA is in favor of multilateral negotiations with the IMF. As I have already said, we support this policy because we think that it strengthens the positions of the debtor countries.

[Question] You are in favor of unity of actions in the international arena. But what about unity within the country and particularly within the trade union movement.

J. Crusado: I think that the main tasks which we in attendance here are setting for ourselves require a rallying of forces. In my opinion, the time has come to create a national trade union council. Trade union organizations and their leaders have always been unanimously making demands for higher wages, more housing and expansion of the system for social assistance. There is unity among the trade union organizations here. In this respect there is no political position which would divide us into various camps.

I. Gamarra: We have managed to achieve certain positive results. This has had a favorable effect on the development and deepening of the struggle for adopting measures which could, although only partially, alleviate the social consequences of the crisis. I am an optimist and I think that we are on the right path for achieving this kind of unity, which will make it possible to defend the rights and demands of the workers with the greatest effectiveness.

[Question] Which methods do the workers use most frequently in the struggle for their rights?

I. Gamarra: The struggle is taking various forms--strikes, hunger strikes, protest marches. Here one must keep in mind the fact that uprisings of the proletariat are severely suppressed by the repressive state apparatus. For example, we are organizing a purely peaceful march, but the police throw tear gas and water bombs at its participants and beat the people with the butts of their rifles.... But nonetheless the struggle is increasing. And as a result the workers are sometimes managing to achieve a certain amount of improvement in their position.

J. Crusado: The main weapon of the proletariat is the strike. The existing constitution has decisively reinforced the right to strike. Incidentally, I had a chance to be a member of the constituent assembly. We were extremely interested in making sure that this right of the workers was reinforced in the basic law. We recognize that our constitution is not a perfect document but nonetheless it goes much further than the Queretaro Declaration which was adopted after the end of the Mexican Revolution.

Now Parliament is considering a plan for corrections to the law that regulates the right to strike.

Trade unions of all ideological trends have warned the government that they will not accept the law if it diminishes or cuts down their rights which are reinforced by the Constitution and are, moreover, under the protection of international labor conventions.

We think that the working class is in a position to reject any initiative, regardless of which political party it may come from, which contradicts the provisions reinforced in our basic law. The right to strike was exercised by the workers even before the adoption of the last constitution, when the trade unions were functioning "de facto" although "de jure" and were not recognized. For this right can be regarded as a natural right of the exploited.

M. Bernasa: The trade union movement has entered the realm of politicization. It is noteworthy that the rise of the labor and trade union movement also brought to life such organizations as, for example, the unitary national leadership of the struggle (CUNL). In conjunction with the trade union organizations it has participated in the general strikes. And it should be noted that the strike included about 95 percent of the unionized population of Peru at that time.

Right-wing forces are trying to break the back of the labor movement, which is causing them a good deal of trouble. They are especially concerned about the fact that the trade union associations are more and more frequently taking unified positions. Some time ago we made efforts in the direction of developing a joint minimum program at the level of the trade union centers. This was done in particular in order to meet the corresponding demands made by our lower organizations. We have tried to give a particular form to these demands.

As for the problem of foreign indebtedness, it is clear to everyone that it will not be easy to pay off \$13 billion plus rapidly increasing interest. There are various interpretations here: some think that this will require decades, others give us 15 years to pay off the debt, still others--20 years and so forth. But the majority agree that almost all of the next loan we receive will go to pay just the interest on credit that was obtained previously.

Under the conditions of the growing impoverishment of the population we are intensifying the process of making the kinds of decisions that are intended to ease the blows of the crisis. We are also trying to bring our platform to the broad public as early as possible so that the political parties participating in the general elections will take a stand on the problems bothering us during the course of the preelection campaign.

An aspect of our work today which is of no small importance is that we are more and more frequently making contacts with political parties. For example, the CTP has gone to the political parties participating in the electoral process with requests for explanations regarding a number of points contained in their preelection platforms. As far as I know the same thing has been done by the CGTP. This shows growing political maturity. Previously we refrained from such steps and were afraid of possible accusations that the trade unions were not doing their own work. Today, on the contrary, we think that dialogue with political forces in the country can only contribute to our development of solutions in the area of leadership of the labor movement.

[Question] What should be the level of syndicalization of the workers in order to increase the political weight of the Peruvian trade union movement? What are the concrete results of the trade union struggle?

J. Crusado: No apolitical trade union movement exists in Peru. You would think that we trade unionists are not politicians. Actually we are politicians. For we are interested in making sure that the political parties "work" for the workers, that when they come to power the political figures will not forget their preelection promises. We demand an updating of obsolete social structures and we are undertaking concrete actions which provide an impetus to the development of political processes.

The right to establish trade unions is reinforced by the Constitution. But up to this point there are still decrees in effect which limit this right. For example, according to Decree 009, one can organize the trade union only at enterprises with no less than 20 workers. We think that the right to join a trade union should not be limited by any conditions.

I. Gamarra: In my opinion neither the Belaunda Terry government nor the government that comes after this one will be able to ignore the influence of the worker and peasant movement on political life.

The peasantry has become quite appreciably more organized. Last year the peasants conducted a general strike which was unprecedented in the history of Peru, a truly militant one in which they blocked the roads and so forth. This means that the peasantry is progressing in its self-awareness.

The same thing can be said about the worker movement. The level of syndicalization among workers as a whole is only 65 percent. In other words, there are still a considerable number of them who are not in trade unions. Therefore raising the level of syndicalization is one of our basic tasks. It cannot be carried out without creating committees in places where the number of workers does not exceed 20. According to existing legislation, as Julio Crusado already said, the establishment of trade unions in such enterprises is prohibited.

The process of syndicalization, especially in a working class environment, is impeded to a certain degree by the position of the owners as well. As soon as the owner learns that a group of workers intends to organize the trade union they are fired. To be sure, the situation is changing for the better. Trade union organizers are immediately going to the trade union centers and in many cases the people who were fired were returned to work, and they continued their activity for organizing trade union cells at those same enterprises.

At the same time our activists are subjected to quite unjustified persecution and repression. At the present moment, for example, under the pretext of fighting against terrorism they have arrested six of our comrades from the provincial organizations.

Under these conditions it is very important that the workers are relieved of the fear of defending their rights in society. This psychological change seems even more positive since at least 60 percent of the Peruvian working class is from 20 to 30 years of age. They have a different way of thinking and they are not so tied to traditional political parties, and they are aware of the need to change the conditions of their life. In spite of the tendentiousness of the bourgeois mass media, there is an appreciably increasing influence of the Peruvian left on the minds of the proletariat.

Summing up, one can say that there are factors which radicalize the social behavior of the masses. And this means that there are conditions for successful development of the worker and peasant movement. As for the trade unions, we shall exert all efforts to defend and expand the social rights of the workers.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

U.S. CONCERN FOR NICARAGUAN 'STATE OF EMERGENCY' SEEN FALSE

Moscow LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST in Russian 2 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by V. Begishev under the rubric "Commentary of the Week": "Defending the Revolution"]

[Text] A turbulent stream of crocodile tears is overflowing the pages of the West's bourgeois newspapers: This time it is in connection with the prolongation of the state of emergency in Nicaragua. It will be recalled that the state of emergency was imposed in 1982 in connection with an acute intensification of the external threat from the United States and its hirelings, remained in force until autumn, 1984, whereupon it was suspended to make it possible to hold general elections in an atmosphere of maximum freedom. The Sandinista government had hoped that Washington would try to stifle its imperialist instincts in view of the obvious will of the Nicaraguan people. Unfortunately, this did not take place. On the contrary, American attacks on the young republic intensified.

Needless to say, a state of emergency has never afforded anyone pleasure, for it entails fundamental restrictions on public life, as well as private. But the Nicaraguan people simply perceive it as a severe necessity. For, as V. I. Lenin himself noted, no revolution is worth anything until it is able to defend itself. The point is not even in the fact that the greatest revolutionary figure said this, but rather that it is an objective truth that history to this day has set before all peoples who have thrown off the yoke of obsolete political systems.

The Voice of America is now whining about the "horrors of totalitarianism" in Nicaragua and bemoaning "trampled human rights." The country's "economic difficulties" are lamented and it is falsely asserted that the Sandinistas are losing the people's support.... Somehow, no one ever heard this sort of thing during Somosa, whom the White House good-naturedly called "our son of a bitch." Chile's present-day Somosa--Pinochet--is only delicately reprimanded for 'excessive firmness' from time to time. The "contras" are represented as courageous freedom-fighters, whose ranks, it's said, are steadily growing.

Yet it is not just a question of "contras": They are being beaten, especially so of late. The bandits have been unable to carry out the task the CIA set for them: To consolidate their position in Nicaraguan territory, establish control over key areas and form a counterrevolutionary 'government' there,

which the White House would officially recognize. To all appearances, the growth in the number of anti-Sandinista units that is being trumpeted by Washington propaganda (if, needless to say, it is not an intentional lie) is an increase in the size of a decaying corpse. But then, the U.S. is not staking everything on one card. On the contrary, it is precisely in connection with the failures of "external" counterrevolution that the U.S. is now devoting special attention to the creation of a "fifth column" within the country, and utilizing ultraright, ultraleft and religious elements toward this end. The state of emergency should be particularly helpful in the struggle against them. After all, the nonparliamentary bourgeois opposition, for example, has already become so brazen as to make a provocative demand: To hold a referendum in order to "determine the people's attitude toward the introduction of a Marxist-Leninist system." This would be sheer joy for Washington, which is doggedly trying to present the Nicaraguan revolutionary democrats as devout "Marxist-Leninists," in the belief that this will undermine their support from social democratic and liberal circles in the West.

Incidentally, it is no accident that bourgeois propaganda is interpreting the Sandinistas' latest steps in precisely this light and it would appear that someone is taking the bait--for example, certain French "leftist" papers. It is surprising that their authors, in so doing, even forget the experience of their own great revolution, which in no way could be considered "Marxist," but which made extremely widescale use of extraordinary measures against its enemies. Following the Americans' lead, they have now picked up the theme of the "abolition of freedoms" in Nicaragua. However, the openly rightist EL FIGARO noted to the point: In any event, such lamentations attest to the fact that freedoms did exist, and therefore all the previous accusations do not have a leg to stand on.

13149/13167
CSO: 1807/127

CHINA/FAR EAST/PACIFIC

USE OF MENTAL HOSPITALS FOR DISSIDENTS IN JAPAN ALLEGED

[Editorial Report] Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian on 14 January 1986 carries on page 3 a 1500-word article by TASS Tokyo correspondent V. Golovnin entitled "A Strait-Jacket for a Dissident". He cites the president of the Japanese Association of Psychiatric Hospitals, Iso Hirota, who claims that Japanese mental hospitals are being turned into places of confinement for "student-agitators...as well as others who are able to disrupt the carefully created display window of 'flourishing Japan'." Golovnin states that people can be committed to such institutions even without special examination by a doctor and that in the last two decades the number of "patients" in mental hospital has risen eight times. The report also claims that cruel punishments are used and that inmates are denied visits from relatives and even the means to write to them. These hundreds of "small concentration camps" the author writes, serve to turn "potentially dangerous" people into "well-behaved citizens".

CSO: 1807/171

MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA/SOUTH ASIA

BRIEFS

DRA ANTIGOVERNMENT MEDIA CENTER--The United States Information Agency plans to expand its coverage of the events in Afghanistan. Congress provides half a million dollars for creating an Afghan media center to encourage and train reporters from anti-government elements. To this day the Americans have supplied the Afghan terrorists with small arms, rockets, landmines and chemical weapons. At bases in Pakistan, CIA instructors have taught these how to use this weaponry against the Afghan people. But now the bandits are to be supplied with television minicams and other journalistic equipment, in addition to the military aid. The United States Information Agency is presumably to print directions for using this paraphernalia as the CIA has printed manuals to train the bandits in the art of murdering civilians and destroying schools and mosques. The United States Information Agency is planning, with the help of false reports prepared by the Afghan bandits, to divert public attention from the undeclared war being waged by the U.S. administration in Afghanistan. In the admission of the bandits' leaders they have special tariffs for killings. The money of course comes from CIA funds. For example, it costs 7,000 Afghanis to kill a government soldier, 15,000 to kill a party worker, and 70,000 to arrange a bomb attack at a market place. How much is the United States Information Agency going to pay the bandits for falsifying reports with the help of minicams? [Excerpts] [Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 21 Dec 85 LD] /8918

CSO: 1812/68

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH ETHIOPIA DETAILED

Overview of Projects

LD300919 Moscow TASS in English 0822 GMT 30 Dec 85

[Text] Moscow 30 December TASS--TASS correspondent Mikhail Petrov writes:

Soviet-Ethiopian economic and technical cooperation today embraces 48 areas and projects. They are of prime importance to the national economic growth of that African country and to the expansion of its export potential. Business contacts between the USSR and Ethiopia are being developed under agreements concluded in 1959 and 1978. A long-term program envisioning extensive cooperation between the two countries in agriculture, industry, geology, power engineering and personnel training was signed in 1984.

A plan to assemble up to 1,000 tractors a year was put into operation in 1984. The country's largest hydropower plant is being built on the Wabi Shebeli River. An oil refinery built with Soviet assistance in Assab is being modernized and several grain depots and refrigerators are about to be completed.

Ten thousand hectares of land are being developed for cultivation near Gambela and livestock-breeding complexes and plants to process meat, cotton, soya beans and oil-bearing crops are planned to be built. Surveys for oil and gas continue in Ogaden.

The polytechnic institute built in the city of Bahr-Dar, built by the Soviet Union as a gift to Ethiopia, is going to be modernized and expanded, and several vocational training schools are being built and equipped.

A large group of Soviet specialists, among them engineers, technicians, teachers and physicians, work in Ethiopia and about 3,000 Ethiopian students attend Soviet educational establishments.

The USSR is giving Ethiopia selfless aid because of the severe drought which has hit the country. In November 1984, 12 AN-12 cargo planes, 24 MI-8 helicopters and 300 cross-country vehicles were sent to Ethiopia. Soviet transportation personnel carried 150,000 people and more than 60,000 tons of freight in a year. A hospital organized by Soviet medical personnel in Asosa attended to more than 100,000 patients. Soviet public organizations and the Russian Orthodox Church have also given relief to the drought-hit population.

Drought Aid Continuing

LD090005 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 8 Jan 86

[A. Kraminov video report from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Soviet specialists are continuing their work to help Ethiopia overcome the effects of drought. When the Ethiopian Government appealed to our country to render the most urgent assistance, a large detachment of truck drivers with over 300 heavy trucks was speedily delivered here on several vessels. At the same time a whole squadron, 12 transport planes and 24 helicopters, arrived. The trucks drove straight from the ship's holds to be loaded, and the very next day the drivers set out on their first 1,000-kilometer run. Since then, they have driven the length and breadth of the country. After a few days' rest in a tent village for our specialists in Addis Ababa, they set off again. They have been doing this for over a year.

[Video shows truck convoy moving along road, carrying large sacks; interview at airport with I.I. Tashkin, head of truck drivers' detachment identified by caption]

[Kraminov] Ivan Ivanovich, what can you tell us about the volume of work your detachment has done?

[Tashkin] We have done a great deal. We have carried over 40,000 tons of produce and medicaments to the disaster area. We have also traveled quite a distance, each vehicle has done over 40,000 km. What else can I tell you? Of course, the newly-arrived drivers will have to work even harder.

[Kraminov] Indeed there remains much work to be done. At present a program of mass evacuation of people from the places that suffered so much from the prolonged drought that they became completely uninhabitable is being implemented. The evacuees [pereselentsy] are settling fertile, but previously sparsely-populated areas. It is essential to keep them supplied with food products, seed for sowing, agricultural equipment, in short, with everything they need.

Soon some novices will join in the work. In 2 or 3 days they will continue the journey begun by their comrades. [Video shows airliner coming in to land; Aeroflot AN-26 transport aircraft parked on airfield; approximately so identical trucks drawn up in rows, others driving past with loads].

Agricultural Development Noted

LD141932 Moscow TASS in English 1726 GMT 14 Jan 86

[Text] Moscow, 14 January TASS--The Gambela District in the south west of Ethiopia will become an area of developed agriculture in near future. Work to cultivate 10,000 hectares of virgin lands is under way in the area with Soviet technical assistance, irrigation facilities are being built, a complex of measures for land reclamation is being implemented. It is envisaged to build

in the Gambela District by joint efforts of organizations of the two countries livestock breeding complexes, meat packing enterprises, economies to grow cotton, soybeans, maize, oil producing and other crops.

An earthfill dam with the height of 26 metres will be built on the Alwero River. It will make it possible to accumulate up to 200 million cubic metres of water for irrigation. The necessary equipment, specifically, drills, trucks and other equipment has been supplied for the construction project by the USSR.

The sides have already carried out aerial photography of the Gambela Valley which will help implement the plans of its development. A TASS correspondent was told at the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations that it is possible to cultivate over 300 thousand hectares in the area and to turn it into Ethiopia's granary.

The USSR and Ethiopia are cooperating also in mechanization of agriculture. Thus, a tractor assembly works has been built and put into operation in Ethiopia with Soviet technical assistance. The works manufactures farm machinery for the successful development of Ethiopia's agriculture.

Cooperation of the two countries in agriculture is of much importance for the development of Ethiopia's agriculture, for making the country self-sufficient in food products.

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CSO: 1812/70

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

BRIEFS

TRADE PROTOCOL WITH ETHIOPIA. (TASS). As a result of the negotiations that were completed at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, a protocol governing trade between the USSR and Socialist Ethiopia in 1986 was signed on 6 November. The protocol stipulates a considerable increase in the commodity turnover between the two countries. The USSR will ship to Socialist Ethiopia machinery and equipment, petroleum, petroleum products, rolled ferrous metals, medicines, and manufactured consumer goods. The import from Ethiopia encompasses a broad group of raw-material commodities and the output of the developing national industry. The protocol was signed on the Soviet side by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade G. K. Zhuravlev, and on the Ethiopian side by Minister of Foreign Trade, and member of the RPE Central Committee Wollie Chekol. [Text] [Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 46, Nov 85 p 22] 5075

ANTI-DROUGHT ORGANIZATION FORMED--Djibouti (IZVESTIYA special correspondent)--The constituent assembly of intergovernmental organizations in the struggle with drought and for development of the countries of East Africa finished its work here. The leaders of six states of the region--Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia signed an agreement on establishing a new organization. Its charter and structure were confirmed. They adopted the basic document--"Plan of Action"--stipulating not only extraordinary and long term drought measures but also socioeconomic development of East Africa. President of Djibouti H.G. Aptidon was elected chairman of the organization for a two year term and Makonnen Kibret (Ethiopia) as executive secretary. The supreme organ, according to the structure, will be the assembly of heads of states and governments; the working organ will be the Council of Ministers and the executive secretariat. Staff headquarters of the organization will be located in Djibouti. The creation of the organization, its chairman stated in his concluding note, is only the first step behind which follow concrete actions by all the member-states of the current association. This allows us to hope that the tragic situation on the continent caused by the drought will never be repeated on such a large scale. The constituent assembly demonstrated the desire of the governments and peoples of the countries of the region for unity and fruitful cooperation for the benefit of Africa. [Text] [Article by Z. Kadymbekov] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 86 p 4]

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